Arguments For and Against Genetic Privacy Protection Laws by Setoyama, Koichi
Osaka University
TitleArguments For and Against Genetic Privacy Protection Laws
Author(s)Setoyama, Koichi
CitationOsaka University Law Review. 54 P.13-P.69
Issue Date2007-02
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/11101
DOI
Rights
Arguments For and Against Genetic Privacy Protection Laws* 
  - Is It Fair to Prohibit the Use of Predictive Medical Information 
       in the Health Insurance and Employment Context? -
Koichi SETOYAMA**
Content
I. Introduction
II. Arguments For and Against Genetic Privacy Protection Laws 
   A. Marne E. Brom 
      1. Insurers' Justifications for Using Genetic Tests to Classify Risks 
      2. Arguments Opposing Use of Genetic Testing 
   B. T. H. Cushing 
      1. Insurers' Arguments in Favor of Using Genetic Testing 
      2. Arguments Against Insurers' Use of Genetic Testing 
   C. Eric Mills Holmes 
      1. Supporting Arguments for Use of Genetic Information by Insurers 
      2. Opposing Arguments for Use of Genetic Information by Insurers 
   D. Richard A. Epstein (Libertarian Argument) 
   E. Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen (Economic Analysis 
      Approach)
III. Adverse Selection 
   A. Practical Problems of Adverse Selection 
   B. Normative Problems of Adverse Selection
IV. Conclusion
**
This paper is the final part of my LL.M. thesis submitted to the University of Wisconsin Law 
School U.S.A. in sommer 2002, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master 
of Laws. Although the original thesis has been modified to some extent, in general the content is 
not revised ai this time. 
Koichi SETOYAMA, Assistant Professor and Foreign Student Advisor at the Graduate School of 
Law and Politics, Osaka University, Japan. Ph.D. in Law 2005, Osaka University; M.L.1. 1999, 
LL.M. 2002, S.J.D. Dissertator ai the University of Wisconsin Law School, U.S.A. 
                                                          13
14 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 54:13
I. Introduction
  In my previous article published in this Law Review, I concluded that the 
ultimate question over genetic discrimination is whether it is justifiable to protect 
the privacy of all predictive medical information, instead of limiting it to genetic 
discrimination, in the insurance and employment context.1) In order to answer this 
question, it seems requisite to examine what kind of unintended adverse 
consequences and side-effects would be produced if the law should prohibit the use 
of all predictive medical information including genetic information and, what the 
theoretical grounds are to justify such a policy in spite of its producing serious side-
effects such as adverse selection. These are the agenda I explore in this paper. I 
will point out the pros and cons of using genetic information and predictive medical 
information in general by reviewing the arguments and debates for and against he 
legal prohibition on the use of genetic information, especially focusing on the 
health insurance setting. 
  In the following sections, I will look into arguments presented by several 
commentators. First, I begin by observing both sides of the argument in the early 
stage of discussion represented by Marne E. Brom (1990) in Section II-A, and by T. 
H. Cushing (1993) in Section II-B. Then, I look into the most comprehensive 
reviews of both sides of the argument by Eric Mills Holmes (1996) in Section II-C. 
And then, I introduce the strong libertarian argument against antidiscrimination 
laws presented by Richard A. Epstein (1994) which criticizes legal prohibition on 
the use of genetic information in Section II-D, and finally in Section II-E, I review 
the Economic approach arguments presented by Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow 
Cohen (2001) against laws designed to prohibit genetic discrimination. Some parts 
of these commentators' arguments overlap each other but we may find différent 
emphasis or persuasiveness in the saine point of argument. 
  The alternatives to protect "all types of predictive medical information" against 
discrimination in the insurance arena are therefore free from the peril and trap of 
genetic exceptionalism2 as long as the information protected legally is not limited
1)
2)
Key Issues and Problenis of Genetic Anti-Discrimination Laws, 53 OSAKA UNIv. LAW Rev. Pp. 
199-241 (2006). 
"genetic exceptionalism" means genetic information is uniquely sensitive and fundamentally 
différent front other medical information, and therefore it requires and deserves special legal 
protection. Sec, Koichi Setoyama, Privacy of Genetic Information, 52 OSAKA UNIV. LAw Rev. pp. 
94-100 (2005).
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to only genetic information. However, a more fundamental issue arises. If we 
introduce such an alternative measure as to protect all predictive medical 
information in the employment and insurance setting, the next issue that we have to 
examine is what kind of adverse consequences and side-effects uch alternatives 
produce. This is a question concerning the issue of what is the theoretical ground to 
justify a policy which prohibits insurers from using medical information, even 
though such prohibition produces serions effects. Without addressing and 
answering these ultimate issues and questions, no real problem can be resolved. 
Accordingly, after reviewing arguments for and against privacy protection laws, in 
Section III, I will address the practical and normative problems of so-called 
"adverse selection" issue as one of the most serious adverse consequences that ma
y 
occur if the law prohibits insurers from taking predictive medical information into 
account. 
  It is important to note that in America, most health insurance is provided 
through employers. According to the Health Insurance Detailed Table 2000 
presented by the U.S. Census Bureau, roughly 177,286 thousand people obtained 
health insurance through employment bases and it constitutes 64.1 percent of the 
total population including uninsureds in 2000.3) Therefore, genetic discrimination 
in health insurance, if we do not use the word "discrimination," say "adverse 
treatment" in the health insurance setting due to the information of genetic defects, 
may increase the adverse treatment in the employment context at the same time. 
This is because employers try to not only avoid decreasing efficiency and 
productivity of the employee itself but also aim at cutting the group insurance 
premiums that the companies have to pay. The implication of this structure 
suggests that by using law, if we can clear the adverse treatment in the insurance 
setting, we can also decrease the employers' incentive to exclude the employees 
with genetic abnormalities who become the factor for increasing the total amount of 
premiums that the companies have to pay to the health insurance company in the 
U.S.A.
II. Arguments For and Against Genetic Privacy Protection Laws
A. Marne E. Brom
More than fifteen years ago, soon after the Human Genome Project started,
3) U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Detailed Table 2000, available at 
   <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin99/dtablel.html> (last visited June 27, 2002).
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Marne E. Brom had already presented arguments supporting and opposing the use 
of genetic test results. It was the beginning of the debate over the use of genetic 
tests or genetic information by insurers and employers, and also it was the time 
when the state statute designed to forbid genetic discrimination began to be 
enacted. Here, I look into these arguments.
   1. Insurers' Justifications for Using Genetic Tests to Classify Risks 
  The first and mort compelling justification for using genetic tests described by 
Brom is the argument hat legal prohibition on using genetic information results in 
"adverse selection." Adverse selection is defined as "the tendency of persons with 
poorer than average health expectations to apply for or renew insurance to a greater 
extent than persons with average or better health expectation."4) After mentioning 
adverse selection in the HIV antibody testing context, Brom explains the 
implication of adverse selection in the insurance setting as follows:
[A]n individual who undergoes genetic testing revealing a genetic 
disease or a propensity toward a genetic disease is more likely to apply 
for insurance or apply for a greater amount of insurance because the 
applicant knows a daim may be likely in the future. If the insurer is not 
permitted to perform genetic tests, or ask the applicant or his attending 
physician for the results of previous testing, adverse selection could 
occur and force the insurer to charge a premium unrelated to the actual 
risk.5)
  Another correlated justification for using genetic tests to classify risks provided 
by insurers is that any legislative restriction on genetic testing constitutes "unfair 
discrimination." Brom states that the situation "[i]ncluding those who [HIV 
antibody] test positive with the rest of the insureds forces the healthy to subsidize 
the less healthy"6) is true of genetic testing as well and, therefore, "[f]ailure to 
separate individuals with différent degrees of risk will allow the insurance 
principles of equity to give way to equality."7) And then, "the healthy would realize
4) Marne E. Brom, Insurance and Genetic Testing: Shopping for That Perfect Pair of Genes, 40 
   DRAKE. L. Rev. 121, 134 (1990-1991) (citing Clifford & luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The 
   Rationale.forAIDS-Related Testing, 100 HAV. L. REV. 1806, 1817 (1987). 
5) Id. at 134-35. 
6) Id. at 135. 
7) Id.
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they were being overcharged or treated unfairly and, therefore, would choose not to 
buy new or further coverage."8) 
  Another argument which supports the insurance company is where some 
individuals "presently possessing no manifestations of a [genetic] disease, but 
having a family history of an inherited disease . . . would benefit from their use of 
genetic testing to classify risks" because "[w]ithout genetic testing, regardless of 
whether these individuals would actually develop to disease, they would be 
classified as substandard or declined, depending on the inherited disease" but "if a 
genetic test indicated they were not carrying the unfavorable gene, the insurance 
coverage could be offered at favorable rates."9) 
  However, Brom points out the following self-defeating consequence of this 
argument:
  If individuals were required to undergo extensive genetic tests and all 
results proved negative, the applicants would have heightened 
expectations of health and longevity. As a result, there would be little 
incentive to purchase large amounts of coverage, or to purchase 
insurance at all.... Therefore, extensive genetic testing by insurers may 
prevent significant numbers of applicants, both healthy and unhealthy, 
from obtaining insurance at affordable rates. 10)
           2. Arguments Opposing Use of Genetic Testing 
  The main arguments opposing use of genetic testing that Brom provides is 
decreasing insurance availability: "Insurers' use of genetic testing or genetic test 
results identifying genetic disorders can potentially increase the number of 
uninsureds by preventing applicants from purchasing insurance, allowing applicants 
to purchase only limited coverage, or requiring applicants to pay increased 
premiums."11) This argument alleges that people cannot afford escalating health 
care costs without health insurance, and therefore, "[f]or many, a denial of health 
insurance will leave them unable to finance the medical costs associated with 
diseases."12) 
  Next, Brom points out a rationale and incentive by which employers
8) Id. 
9) Id. 
10) Id. at 136. 
11) Id. 
12) Id. at 137.
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discriminate against prospective and present employees which would result in 
employment availability. According to Brom, there are three main motivations or 
incentives when employers use genetic testing; concern for employees' job 
performance, safety in workplace, and concern for insurance cost. 
  He notes that "although employers' use of genetic testing may begin with 
concern for safety and productivity, it extends to the general health of employees 
affecting the employer's future cost of medical care."13) He further explains the 
reason for this:
  Insurance costs are the largest single component of employee 
benefits, constituting thirty-seven percent of total payroll costs. .. The 
amount an employer pays for worker's compensation insurance is often 
determined by the past claim experience record of the employer. 
Therefore, employers may find genetic testing an attractive tool for 
effecting a strategy to avoid compensation claims and higher insurance 
costs by excluding individuals with adverse genetic predispositions. 14)
  Brom describes the employers' economic incentives to perform genetic tests in 
the large group employer-sponsored insurance plans:
[I]ndividual underwriting is seldom performed by the insurer for a large 
group plan. Rather, the group as a whole is underwriting and priced 
according to past claims experience. Therefore, the group may contain 
individuals who would not individually qualify for coverage. The 
inclusion of such individuals increases the employer's cost of insurance. 
This provides an incentive for the employer to perform genetic testing at 
the time of hiring.1 5)
  It is maintained by Brom that in the self-insurer plan, employers also have 
economic incentives to perform genetic tests: `Recause self-insuring employers 
avoid state insurance regulation, self-insurers have the advantage of using tests and 
testing information that some states deny to insurance companies."16) He continues 
to insist that "[therefore, self-insurers' access to test information, coupled with
13) Id. at 138. 
14) Id. at 139. 
15) Id. 
16) Id.
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economic incentives to deny employment to individuals with adverse genetic tests, 
exacerbates the problem of unavailable health insurance.17) 
  Brom states that "[t]he threat of unemployment andthe unavailability of health 
coverage, however, is not limited to individuals involved with large group 
employment-sponsored plans and self-insuring employers."18) This fear is also true 
of individuals applying for small group coverage because [s]mall companies may 
pay part of the cost of their employees' individual insurance" and "[t]he employer 
will indirectly know of a prospective mployee's unfavorable genetic test results 
when the applicant does not qualify for insurance at a standard rate" and therefore, 
"[t]he increase in the em
ployer's cost of providing health insurance provides an 
incentive to deny employment to those who cannot qualify for insurance at standard 
rates".19) 
  Accordingly, Brom concludes that "regardless of whether the employer self-
insures, and regardless of the size of the group plan offered by an employer, 
unfavorable genetic test results provide the employer a considerable conomic 
incentive to refrain from hiring some prospective mployees."20) 
  Another scenario on consequence and implication of using genetic test and its 
result is described by Brom as follows:
  The money employers ave by refusing to hire workers on the basis of 
genetic tests will increase societal colts. If all employers use tests to 
detect common genetic predispositions, prospective employees with 
unfavorable results will find themselves excluded from most jobs. 
Society will be forced to bear the increased burden of providing 
unemployment and health care benefits for these individuals.21>
  Brom also states the adverse implication of using genetic test results over the 
availability in family insurance. In a family insurance policy , normally "unborn as 
well as qualifying born children are automatically covered until at least each child's 
eighteenth year."22) The medical cost for children who have genetic disorders is 
extremely high "because many of the conditions are not immediately fatal . ,23)
17) Id. 
18) Id. 
19) Id. 
20) Id. 
21) Id. 
22) Id. at 140-41. 
23) Id. at 141.
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Therefore, Brom asserts that "[i]t is possible that companies will decide to grant 
family policies with a rider that only children born without identifiable genetic 
defects are eligible for coverage."24) 
  Brom also mentions a concern for infringing on confidentiality raised by using 
genetic test and information: "If insurers are permitted to use genetic testing or 
acquire genetic information from an applicants' attending physician, this 
information will be recorded in data bank."25) "Typically, insurers ask applicants to 
sign a blanket consent form allowing the insurers to examine the applicant's 
medical history. ...once records are in the insurer's hands, the records may be 
further disclosed to data centers such as the Medical Information Bureau 
("MIB")."26) "The MIB serves as a detective agency and allows insurance 
companies to exchange applicants' medical findings and test results."27) 
  In sum, as we have seen in Brom's review, in the early discussion stage, the 
main argument supporting the use of genetic information was adverse selection and 
its adverse implication in the market. The opposing argument was mainly based on 
the possibility of genetic discrimination. It is noteworthy that Brom emphasizes the 
incentives that employers discriminate employees when discussing the argument 
that opposes the use of genetic tests in insurance.
B. T. H. Cushing
       1. Insurers' Arguments in Favor of Using Genetic Testing 
a. Fair Discrimination Perspective 
  The first argument Cushing mentions is based on the traditional fair 
discrimination perspective theory of insurance. According to this perspective, the 
"[p]rimary goal of underwriting is the accurate prediction of the costs of death (how 
much an insured has paid in premiums before the insured dies versus the face value 
of the policy) and sickness (how much the insured has paid in premiums versus the 
cost of medical care for diseases the insured will contract."28) The former is called 
"future mortality costs" and the latter is called "morbidity costs." And "[tjhrough
24) Id. 
25) Id. at 141-2. 
26) Id. at 142. 
27) Id. 
28) T. H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing In Insurance Risk Classification?: Arguments 
   Both For and Against the Use of This New Technology May Be "Right, " and Sonie Form of 
   Universal Health Care May Be the Result, 60 DEF. COLINS. J 249, 253 (1993).
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underwriting, insurers classify applicants in accordance with factors such as age, 
sex, occupation, health history and the use of tobacco or alcohoL"29) 
  Cushing describes the importance of assessing risk properly:
If an insurer under-assesses certain risks, it will not have sufficient funds 
to pay all the daims made in the future, unless it overcharges people who 
represent little or no risk. Without sufficient funds to meet contractual 
obligations, insurers will go bankrupt and leave many insureds without 
coverage. On the other hand, because of the free market nature of the 
insurance industry, if an insurer over-assesses the risks and sets 
premiums too high, , prospective customers will purchase from other 
insurers.30)
With genetic testing, ... they [insurance companies] will be able to 
predict the future mortality and morbidity costs so accurately that they 
will be able to reduce premiums to the majority of people. Genetic 
testing, ... will increase the availability of insurance by eliminating some 
of the guesswork. People who smoke and drink but have "rock-solid" 
genes-for example, anti-lung cancer and anti- alcoholism-may qualify 
for lower premiums than would otherwise be the case. 31)
  Cushing points out the insurers' fears behind this argument: "AIDS and genetic 
diseases are similar in that they can be predicted years before the appearance of 
symptoms. Legislative prohibitions on insurers' use of genetic testing also raire 
insurers' fears that applicants may select adversely against insurers."32)
b. Genetic Testing Not Revolutionary 
  Another argument which justifies using genetic testing by insurers is epitomized 
by the following question: "Why should insurers be allowed access to most types of 
medical information but not to the genetic information that underlies the non-
genetic medical history?"33) This argument asserts that "genetic testing, like AIDS 
testing, is no différent from the many other sorts of tests performed by physicians to
29) Id. at 253. 
30) Id. 
31) Id. 
32) Id. at 254. 
33) Id.
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which insurers routinely have access."34) This is because "the present forms of 
medical testing routinely relied on by insurers also reveal conditions that existed 
prior to the issuance of the policy."35) Thus, genetic testing is not revolutionary.
c. Consequence of Legislative Prohibitions 
  Another argument for using genetic information depends on the adverse 
consequences resulted from legislative prohibitions. One of these consequences is 
"adverse selection ."
If you do not allow insurers the use of genetic testing, then insurers (1) 
will get out of the business on their own, (2) will spread the costs that 
they could not have anticipated to all of their customers..., or (3) may 
be driven out of business by unforeseeable claims, which insurers call 
"adverse selection."36)
  Adverse selection means "that people who have undergone testing and have 
tested positive for a genetic disorder will attempt to buy as much insurance as they 
can to cover the colt of future illness when the genetic disorder expresses itself."37) 
  Also prohibition on using genetic testing is against "state unfair trade practices 
acts. This act compels insurers to discriminate between insureds on the basis of 
their risk factors. For example, unfair trade practices acts deem it inequitable to 
charge identical premiums for life insurance to a 60-year-old man in poor health 
and 20-year-old woman in good health."38) 
  Cushing also describes the argument by insurers from even a societal point of 
view, banning insurers using genetic test information; in other words, forcing them 
to ignore relevant actuariat data leads to adverse consequences: "[A]llowing them 
[insurers] to use genetic testing and survive financially so that they can cover most 
people at affordable rates is preferable to driving them out of business and leaving 
their former customers uninsured or underinsured."39) 
  Another unacceptable consequence of legal banning of the use of genetic tests is 
that it admits applicants' fraud and denies insurers' contestability for
34) Id. 
35) Id. 
36) Id. 
37) Id. 
38) Id. at 255. 
39) Id.
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misrepresentation of the insureds' risks. This argument asserts that one 
consequence of legislative prohibition on the use of genetic tests by insurers is that 
it voids the exclusion clause which prevents insureds from engaging in fraud, that 
is, misrepresentations or concealment of pre-existing conditions. 40)
        2. Arguments Against Insurers' Use of Genetic Testing 
  The arguments against insurers' use of genetic testing resorting to its adverse 
consequence for the prospective or present insureds are described as follows by 
Cushing.
[I]nsurers' use of genetic testing as a classification tool...will produce 
unfair results. While a few "genetically healthy" people who do not need 
health insurance will be able to get it at a reduced premium rate, the vast 
majority who do need health insurance will not be offered the chance or 
will not be able to afford what's offered.41)
a. Uninsurability as Denial of Health Care 
  Another argument against insurers' using genetic information is that it prevents 
genetically unlucky people from receiving health care service.
[G]enetic testing could create a class of people who cannot get health 
insurance coverage, and denial of health insurance today is the 
equivalent of a denial of health care for many Americans. Already the 
fairness of the health insurance system is questioned because it denies 
coverage to the individuals who need it most.42)
  Cushing points out an ironical consequence: "[t]he possible result would be that 
those able to obtain health insurance would be those who do not need it because 
they have 'healthy gene."'43) 
  And also this uninsurability creates a chilling effect which leads people to 
refrain from undergoing genetic tests: "[n]ot being genetically tested for fear of 
losing insurance coverage could cost the individual and the health care system"44)
40) Id. at 255-56. 
41) Id. at 257. 
42) Id. at 258. 
43) Id. at 257. 
44) Id. at 258.
24 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 54: 13
  Cushing notes how useless taking genetic tests would be, if its positive result 
means denial of health insurance:
The knowledge that one will develop a disease in the future is worthless 
without the ability to pay for the Bene treatments that are certain to be 
expensive, if and when they are available. Applicants for insurance will 
not be inclined to investigate their potential for genetic diseases if they 
sense that the disheartening news of a positive result will be coupled 
with a total abandonment by all insurers.45)
b. Confidentiality 
  Another argument, Cushing notes, justifying legal prohibition on using genetic 
tests and their results is that genetic information is différent from other types of 
medical information readily accessible to insurers because of its immutable 
characteristics.
  The Medical Information Bureau is an unincorporated trade 
association whose several hundred members are the largest insurance 
companies in North America. The MIB has created a "list of 
impairment," which is intended to summarize information vital to 
insurers. ... whenever an application contains information about genetic 
testing or a claim for the colt of genetic testing filed with an insurer, that 
insurer files a coded report containing identifying data about the 
insured....46)
  Therefore, if we accept insurers' using genetic tests and such 
confidentiality of most personal genetic information will not be protected.
data, the
c. Infliction of Emotional Harm 
  The final argument supporting legal banning on using genetic tests for insurance 
underwriting, Cushing mentions, is that it inflicts emotional harm to the insured: 
"[T]he [genetic] information the testing reveals will have devastating psychological 
impacts on the perlons tested, particularly when no treatment may be available or 
affordable for years to come."47)
45) Id. 
46) Id. at 259. 
47) Id.
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  After reviewing both sides of the argument, Cushing asserts that "[b]oth insurers 
and their critics are 'right' about his issue" because "[i]f insurers are not allowed to 
use genetic testing, private insurers will disappear-either by choice or by 
bankruptcy" and "[i]f insurers are allowed to use genetic testing, they will deny 
coverage to many people who will become uninsurable." Therefore, Cushing 
concludes that some type of universal health care system may be the result.
C. Eric Mills Holmes
  One of the most comprehensive and detailed descriptions concerning arguments 
both supporting and against the use of genetic information in the insurance setting 
is presented by Eric Mills Holmes. Let me summarize it.
  1. Supporting Arguments for Use of Genetic Information by Insurers 
a. Fair Discrimination Is Efficient in Insurance Underwriting 
  The first argument supporting the use of genetic information listed by Holmes is 
the assertion that fair discrimination is efficient insurance underwriting. This 
argument consists of three reasons: i) the law governing insurance underwriting has 
been the equitable, not equal, principle; ii) the history of insurance risk 
classification justifies fair discrimination in underwriting; iii) the use of genetic 
tests is efficient and equitably fair.
               i. Equitable, not Equal, Justification 
  The prohibition of insurers' access to and use of genetic information is against 
the principle of equity, that is the goal of insurance underwriting: "[T]he 
fundamental tenets of underwriting are selection of insureds based on sound 
actuariat standards, proper balance within each rate classification, and equity 
among policyholders."48) 
  Holmes states: "Risk transference and distribution are the keys to understanding 
the nature of insurance and insurance underwriting. Insurance is an arrangement for 
the transference of the risks of fortuitous losses to an insurer and the distribution of 
those risks among insureds who pay a premium to a common fund."49) In these 
settings, "[t]he principle underwriting insurance is 'fair discrimination' predicated 
on efficient, actuarial analysis in establishing risk transference and risk
48) Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilenzma in Light 
   of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 533 (1996-97) (emphasis added). 
49) Id. ai 531.
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distribution." For example, in life insurance, "failure to distinguish women, who 
present lower risks of early death, from men is unfairly discriminatory against 
women in favor of men." On the other hand, "[r]egarding annuities which pay until 
death, it is unfairly discriminatory against men and in favor of women." In other 
words, it means "the failure to differentiate between insureds results in unfair 
discriminatory rates because it forces policyholders with lower actuarially predicted 
risk to subsidize other policyholders with higher expected risk."50) 
  It is well known that "[t]he very nature of insuranceis discriminatory because 
individuals with a higher risk are routinely charged a higher premium."51) For 
example, "a smoker is charged a higher premium than a non-smoker for a life 
insurance policy because, all other factors being equal, a smoker epresents a higher 
mortality and morbidity risk than a non-smoker."52) And "rates are established and 
premiums charged based on the principle of equity, not equality."53) Equity means 
"[t]he lower the actuarially expected risk
, the lower the premium. The higher the 
expected risk, the higher the premium."54) Therefore, "equitable premiums vary 
according to the risk transferred."55) Equitable treatment of applicants and 
policyholders means that "insureds with the same or similar actuarially predicted 
risk of loss are charged the same."56)
            ii. History of Insurance Risk Classification 
  Holmes states that the history of insurance risk classification in the United 
States provides further support for fair discrimination. He begins by explaining the 
importance of risk classification in insurance:
  The pooling of risks with similar characteristics for the purpose of 
determining insurability and price is the bedrock principle of a workable, 
voluntary, private insurance system. This process, called risk 
classification, not only permits insurers to exercise their right to earn a 
reasonable profit but also creates an equitable insurance system for all 
policyholders. ... Allowing insurers access to genetic testing, mapping,
50) Id. at 532. 
51) Id. 
52) Id. 
53) Id. 
54) Id. 
55) Id. 
56) Id.
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and other relevant information regarding an individual's genotype...will 
be necessary for proper risk classification. A system that does not 
classify risks will inevitably cease to be a private insurance system. If 
insurers are denied access to genetic information it would threaten 
insurers' solvency by undercutting the use of actuarially sound risk 
classifications to properly and fairly price insurance policies.57)
  Holmes states that the history of insurance risk classification in the United 
States supports these arguments. According to his explanation, in the U.S., the 
insurance risk classification te, establish premium rates has shifted from 
"community rating" to "experience rating." In community rating, "fair risk 
distribution" is emphasized and the premium rate is established based on "the 
average cost of all insured policyholders within a defined geographical region."58) 
For example, "the carly non-profit Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan used a community 
rating system"59) and "[a]ll premiums were the saure for all policyholders regardless 
of the actual experience of the group."60) On the other hand, in experience rating, 
"fair discrimination" is emphasized and it "bases premium rates on the current 
claims made by the particular group-the group's experience."61) 
  Holmes explains why community rating has been replaced by experience rating. 
In the history of the U.S., the advent of commercial insurers used an experience 
rating system to classify risks, and "because this system [experience rating] looks 
only at the group being insured, it allows these insurers to offer low rates by 
excluding from the calculation of premiums higher risk individuals."62) And also 
"[t]his shift in pricing has the effect of reducing the forced subsidy of redistributing 
risk of loss from those with high expected medical costs to those with low expected 
medical costs."63) Therefore, these profit insurers "lured away low-risk Blue Cross 
insureds by separately classifying them and giving them a lower premium."64) 
  Holmes views this shift was inevitable because of the following reason:
[T]he health care system in the United States is financially
57) Id. at 534-35. 
58) Id. at 536. 
59) Id. 
60) Id. at 537. 
61) Id. at 536. 
62) Id. at 536-37. 
63) Id. at 537. 
64) Id.
28 OSAKA UNI VERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 54:13
administered through a private insurance system. Therefore, . . . health 
insurance is a business. If this private system is to survive, it is necessary 
to allow the continued operation of the free market to the extent that it is 
equitable for all involved.65)
  As the above U.S. History evidences, the shift from community rating system to 
experience rating shows, "properly utilized risk classification fuels an effective 
private system, enhances insurer solvency, encourages fair treatment of all 
policyholders, and provides an enormous public benefit through widely-available, 
low-cost health, life, and other health-related insurance."66) Consequently, this 
argument asserts that it is indispensable to take genetic information into account for 
a sound insurance risk classification and therefore, this supports fair discrimination 
which avoids the situation where high-cost subscribers are subsidized by low-cost 
subscribers.
       iii. Use of Genetic Tests Is Efficient and Equitably Fair 
  Another argument supporting the insurer's use of genetic information based on 
the assertion of fair discrimination, alleges that use of genetic tests is efficient and 
equitably fair. 
  As we have seen before, "[t]he present health insurance industry has 
fundamentally abandoned an equitable community-wide rating system where the 
health costs for everyone in society are aggregated and premium charges are spread 
equally among all insureds. Health underwriting has been replaced by a system 
based on 'experience rating' by selective groupings."67) In the present experience 
rating system, it is alleged that "[b]ecause the primary goal of insurance 
underwriting is the accurate prediction of mortality and morbidity colts, any 
medical tests which will be useful in assessing risks should be available to 
insurers." 68) For example, "[i]nsurers argue that women live longer than men, are 
safer drivers than men, and incur higher medical costs than men. Because the risks 
are différent for men and women, the premiums hould reflect these différences."69) 
  Holmes explains the reasons why accurate risk assessment is so essential to the 
business of insurance by describing two scenarios which could potentially arise, if
65) Id. 
66) Id. at 535. 
67) Id. at 538-39. 
68) Id. at 538. 
69) Id.
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risks are not properly assessed
(1) If an insurer underassesses ri ks, it will have insufficient funds to pay 
claims submitted unless it overcharges people who represent low risk. If 
insurers have inadequate funds and are unable to meet their contractual 
obligations to pay claims, the insurers will go bankrupt, leaving people 
uninsured. (2) If an insurer overassesses risk and overcharges, the free 
market and competitive nature of business logically dictate that people 
wili purchase insurance lsewhere.70)
  Holmes also explains the importance of accurate risk assessment in the light of 
fairness among insureds:
[T]he rate-setting philosophy of insurance companies is founded on the 
equitable treatment, not equal treatment, of all applicants for health 
insurance. Rates should be adequate, not excessive, and discriminate 
fairly between insureds. ... Rates should not be excessive, because 
excessive rates impose undue burden on insureds. To achieve adequate 
non-excessive rates, insurers must discriminate fairly so that each 
insured will pay in accordance with the quality of his/her life and health.
  This argument asserts that genetic testing will provide a valuable tool for 
insurers to assess the risk more accurately to promote efficiency in the insurance 
market and achieve equitable fairness in premium rating. 
  A paternalistic ground is also alleged by this argument:
Because insurers try to correlate premiums with actuarial risk, genetic 
information could lower a person's premiums or allow an individual 
previously considered uninsurable to obtain health insurance. For 
example, because Huntington's disease is a monogenic disorder, a child 
of parents who are both carriers of the gene would have a fifty percent 
chance of inheriting this genetic disease. However, if the couple's child 
tested negative for the disease-causing gene, the child would then be able 
to obtain more affordable insurance. Consequently, instead of all 
children whose parents are Huntington's disease gene carriers being
70) Id.
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rejected, half of them would qualify for insurance."71)
  Moreover, it is alleged that using genetic tests makes it psychologically easier 
for the insured to accept high premiums:
Assuming that the risk was ascertainable but found to be high, the 
applicant, with this confirmed knowledge [accurate assessment of risk by 
using genetic test], would likely feel that it was fair to pay a higher 
premium for the correspondingly high risk. Applicant [for insurance] 
would probably not accept a policy with a very high premium charge 
unless the applicant had reason to believe that even though the premium 
was quite high, the insurer had nevertheless underestimated the risk. 
Thus, equal access by the insurer and insured to the insured's genetic 
information would produce fair results: not only would previously 
uninsurable people find coverage, but relatively high premiums would be 
justifiable.72)
Furthermore, another efficient and paternalistic ground is alleged:
  Another example where equal access to the insured's genetic 
knowledge would produce favorable results to the insured is where an 
insured has a gene which in conjunction with external factors results in 
disease. That insured's decision to take appropriate measures to reduce 
the risk of disease would include the economic benefit of a lower 
premium based on the insurer's use of risk classifications. For instance, 
if an insured has a gene associated with cancer, then lie or she would 
likely choose to periodically monitor the condition and follow a 
physician's advice in reducing the risk through appropriate changes in 
lifestyle. . . . [I]mmediate conomic and potentially long-lasting health 
benefits would be derived. ... Therefore, equal access to genetic 
information for proper risk classification has the positive effect of 
creating loss prevention incentives in insureds."73)
As can be seen, many arguments alleging efficiency and fairness of using
71) Id. at 540. 
72) Id. 
73) Id. at 540-41.
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genetic information as a fair discrimination for both the insurer and insured are 
presented to criticize genetic antidiscrimination laws. In the next subsection, I will 
review another argument focusing on asymmetries of information and its adverse 
effect on the insurance market according to Holmes' analysis.
b. Equal Access to Genetic Information Fairly Rectifies the Unfairness of 
  Imperfect Information in Underwriting
    i. Applicant's Good Faith Duty to Disclose Genetic Information 
  This argument alleges that equal access to genetic information by both the 
insurers and insureds is indispensable for actuarially fair risk classification because 
"the absence of genetic information will cause economically inefficient unfaimess 
arising from imperfect information between insurer and applicant about applicant's 
future health care needs. Imperfect information is an obstacle to an effectively 
functioning market."74) 
  This argument alleges that antidiscrimination laws create this asymmetry of 
information which imposes good faith duty to disclose genetic information on 
applicants for insurance:
If an applicant knows materially adverse genetic facts regarding the 
applicant's foreseeable need for later medical treatment and care, and 
also knows that the insurer does not have equal access to these material 
genetic facts, then that applicant has a good faith obligation to disclose 
this information to protect he insurer's solvency and to ensure equitable 
premiums.75)
  It is asserted that "[a]n applicant should rot be allowed to take advantage of that 
undisclosed personal knowledge in purchasing insurance at an unreasonably low 
premium rate that subsequently will rot adequately cover the applicant's daims. An 
applicant's bad faith non-disclosure is tantamount to fraud against he insurer and 
other policyholders."76) Therefore, it is alleged that "[a]llowing insurers access to 
an applicant's genetic tests and personal genomic information rectifies the problem 
of imperfect information regarding enetic risks."77)
74) Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
75) Id. (emphasis added). 
76) Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
77) Id.
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                      ii. Adverse Selection 
  Another strong and well known argument which consists of reasons that support 
equal access to genetic information is adverse selection. 
  It is alleged that because of the antidiscrimination laws which deny the use of 
genetic information in risk classification, "[i]f an insurer cannot distinguish and 
classify high-risk applicants from low-risk applicants, the insurer must offer all 
applicants the saure premium for the saure coverage. Low-risk applicants are then 
worse off and high-risk applicants are better off than in a properly functioning 
insurance risk classification system."78) And adverse selection occurs "when people 
with a greater probability of loss than reflected in their premiums buy and continue 
insurance coverage to a greater extent han other people. In an insurance market in 
which adverse selection is substantially present, low-risk people `actually subsidize 
the insurance purchases of high risks."'79) 
  The general process whereadverse selection would be triggered due to the 
inequality in information between applicants or insureds and insurers is explained 
as follows:
An applicant with knowledge of a high risk of loss will probably apply 
for insurance covering that high risk more than the average person. If 
insurers charge an equitably rated premium without knowledge of the 
high risk or charge an equal premium for ail applicants, the high-risk 
person will select to apply and obtain insurance in greater proportion 
than low-risk people.80)
  Likewise, the process of adverse selection in genetic information is explained as 
follows:
  The potential for adverse selection increases as genetic information 
becomes available to insurance consumera. If an individual undergoes 
genetic testing and tests positive for a genetic disorder, that person may 
seek to buy as much insurance as is available to cover the costs of future 
illnesses which may later be expressed. If insurers are legislatively
78) Id. 
79) Id. at 543-44 (quoting Mark J. Browne & Helen 1. Doerpinghaus, Information Asymmetrics and 
   Adverse Selection in the Market,for Individual Medical Expense Insurance, 60 J. RISK & INS. 300 
  (1993». 
80) Id. at 544.
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prohibited from requiring genetic tests and from obtaining the results of 
genetic tests, they may insure individuals at rates that do not reflect the 
true risk_81)
  Holmes describes the probable cycle of the adverse consequences of this adverse 
selection by stating that "the insurer must increase the premium price for insurance 
coverage because of unexpected claims"82) attributed to adverse selection; because 
of this, "low-risk insureds, noting the increase in premium, select to discontinue 
their insurance coverage"S3) and thus "the remaining pool of insured-policyholders 
bas a higher than average risk of loss"84) and "insurers then must again raise the 
premium pricei85) and finally "either an equilibrium is reached with some of the 
low-risk insureds still buying the insurance, or the insurer's risk pool entirely 
separates."86) 
  Holmes mentions that in the future, if a biotechnology company creates at-home 
genetic tests and "if these tests are widely used, and the insurers are legislatively 
precluded from obtaining the same genetic information to which individuals have 
access, then there is a risk of widespread adverse selection."87) And "if individuals 
test negative for a variety of genetic disorders, they may elect to purchase little or 
no insurance, while those who test positive, and who will submit the majority of 
claims, will be the primary people to purchase as much health insurance as 
possible."88) Consequently, this "result[s] in catastrophic failures in the insurance 
industry, leaving many individuals uninsured altogether."89)
                  iii. Incontestability Clauses 
  In general, in a situation where "an applicant [for insurance] bas a good faith 
duty to disclose material facts about prior genetic testing or personally-known 
related genetic data, and conceals that genetic information in the application/ 
contract formation process [or] ... affirmatively misrepresents or omits personal 
genetic information," insurers have "contract-vitiating defenses for fraud, non-
81) Id. at 545. 
82) Id. at 544. 
83) Id. 
84) Id. 
85) Id. 
86) Id. 
87) Id. at 545. 
88) Id. 
89) Id.
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disclosure, concealment, misrepresentation, and possibly mistake" and "seek 
rescission on the insurance contract."9o) 
  However, Incontestability Clauses which are normally prescribed in the 
insurance policies by state insurance statutes or regulations, impose limits on the 
insurers' contestability for applicants' fraud and misrepresentation, and so on. 
  The implication of the existence of incontestability clauses is stated by Holmes 
as follows:
[Incontestability clauses] prevent insurers from asserting contract-
vitiating defense and disputing the validity of a policy after it has been in 
effect for two years. Practically speaking, contractual incontestability 
provisions create a type of contractual two-year statute of limitations 
during which insurers must uncover an applicant's fraud or bad faith in 
the contract formation process. .. Fraudulent insureds are rewarded for 
their misconduct by paying an unfairly low premium, while honest 
insureds pay an unfairly high premium. .. The untoward, unfair effects 
of uncontestability [sic] clauses can be avoided by granting insurers 
equal access to an applicant's genetic information."91)
[M]any genetic disorders can be detected many years before their 
expression. Consequently, where an applicant had knowledge of personal 
genetic information regarding medical diseases and conditions which 
would affect insurability or premium rates and did not fairly share this 
information with the insurer at the time of application, these 
incontestability clauses may later prevent an insurer from claiming bad 
faith non-disclosure or even fraudulent misrepresentation.92)
  Consequently, it is alleged that "[r]equired disclosure of genetic testing data 
thereby would eliminate problems associated with imperfect information and 
provide a fairly priced product of insurance for all applicants."93)
c. State's Unfair Trade Practices Statute 
  Another argument is based on the supremacy of state regulations on the
90) Id. at 546. 
91) Id. at 547-48. 
92) Id. at 548. 
93) Id.
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insurance industry. State insurance laws, modeled on the Unfair Trade Practices 
Act ("UTPA"), require insurers to use genetic information to achieve state-
mandated fair discrimination and prohibit unfair discrimination. Under these state 
statutes "[u]nfairness in the insurance context occurs when equal risks are treated 
differently or unequal risks are treated equally."941 For example, "the Act deems it 
inequitable to charge the saure premiums for life insurance to a fifty-year-old man 
in poor health and a twenty-year-old woman in good health."95) Under these state 
unfair trade practices, "grouping high-risk insureds with low-risk insureds and 
charging all an equal premium is unfair discrimination because the low-risks pay 
too much and subsidize the high-risks who pay too little."961 And these statutes 
"help assure that insurance companies are not rendered financially unsound due to 
an improper isk classification."97) 
  Accordingly,it is alieged that "insurers have a responsibility under the UTPA to 
treat all their policyholders fairly by setting premiums at a level consistent with the 
risk presented by each individual insured. ,98) Therefore, "insurers will be required 
to use this [genetic] information under the states' versions of the UTPA to fulfill the 
statutory mandate of fair discrimination. "99) In sum, "[s]ound and fair actuarial 
underwriting principles necessitate the consideration of genetic information in 
classifying and underwriting risk. Therefore, to avoid violating the states' version 
of the UTPA, health insurers must require and use genetic testing of applicants in 
the insurance contract-formation process."100)
d. Insurers Will Fairly Use Genetic Information in Risk Rating 
  Another argument alleges that "[t]he foundation of private health insurance is 
risk rating. Through competition, risk rating should be fair and should give 
policyholders the best value for their money."101) However, antidiscrimination laws 
intending to ban the use of genetic information creates imperfect information "such 
as insurers not knowing the results of genetic testing of applicants when 
determining risk classifications." This imperfect information should be avoided in 
order to keep "insurance costs low and product availability high for the great
94) Id. at 551. 
95) Id. at 550. 
96) Id. at 552. 
97) Id. at 551. 
98) Id. at 552. 
99) Id. 
100) Id. at 553. 
101) Id.
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majority of insurance applicants."102) Accordingly, it is alleged that "genetic tests, 
along with more traditional medical questionnaires and tests, are essential in 
providing insurers with medical history for statistically fair evaluation of all 
applicants for health insurance." 103)
e. Genetic Testing Conforms to Current Underwriting Practices and Will 
  Not Affect an Applicant's Ability to Main Insurance 
  Another argument supporting the use of genetic testing alleges that genetic 
testing conforms to current underwriting practices and will not affect an applicant's 
ability to obtain insurance. This argument is based on the following reasons:
First, the cost of genetic testing and mapping may be too high for 
insurers to use these techniques routinely. ... Second, most health 
insurance and forty percent of the life insurance obtained in the United 
States is obtained by large groups of employees from their employers. 
Insurers do not customarily undertake individual underwriting or testing 
in connection with employer-provided large-group insurance. ... Third, 
for the smaller group of individuals applying for private health insurance 
policies, insurance companies will have little reason for generaily 
requiring genetic tests. Of the individuals who are tested, some will have 
their eligibility adversely affected while others will be positively affected 
if, for instance, the test reveals no deleterious genetic conditions. Forth, . 
.. a considerable amount of genetic information is presently obtained 
through means other than DNA-based genetic tests. These non-DNA 
genetic tests include biochemical tests, chromosome examinations, and 
physical examinations."104)
  Consequently, it is asserted that "[i]nsurers do not expect that genetic 
information will affect many people's access to private health, life, and disability 
insurance."105) This is also because of the fact that "[g]enetic testing is not 
radically différent from the many other tests which are currently performed by 
physicians and to which insurers have access. ... Many current tests also predict
102) Id. at 554-55. 
103) Id. at 555. 
104) Id. at 555-56. 
105) Id. at 555.
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future disease and illnesses."106)
f. Analogous Employment Discrimination Based on Genotype Is Fair 
   The final argument Holmes mentions, is based on the assertion that analogous 
employment discrimination based on genotype is fair. 
   It is alleged that unless it is "invidious discrimination" such as "discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability," it is a well 
known fact that historically "[e]mployment discrimination has long been legally, 
ethically, and socially acceptable" and indeed presently "[e]mployers differentiate, 
or discriminate, routinely among job applicants with differing educational, 
intellectual, and experiential qualifications." 107) Therefore, it is alleged that 
"employers may fairly discriminate based on other genetic characteristics. In other 
words, employers may hire and retain individuals predicated on occupationally-
relevant physical and character traits which are largely dictated by genetics."108) 
For instance, "[w]hen an employer efuses to hire an individual because that person 
lacks certain relevant physical qualifications, or conversely, when an employer 
prefers one individual over another because of physical characteristics, the 
employer has discriminated based on factors which are, in part, genetically 
controlled."109) 
  In the United States, most of the health insurance of the employees are obtained 
through employers and the "rising cost of health care has significantly increased 
employer health insurance costs."11() Therefore, "employers have . . . a strong 
financial incentive to reduce their health care expenditures by more accurately 
assessing health risks."111) Consequently, it is natural that "employers may control 
their premiums for large-group experience rated health insurance policies or the 
costs of self-insurance by discriminating against genetically high-risk individuals in 
the hiring process."112) Analogously, it is alleged that if employers are allowed to 
discriminate against employees who have genetic defects in this way, "it would be 
inequitable to not allow insurers to create fair risk ratings based on genetic 
information." 113)
106) Id. at 556. 
107) Id. 
108) Id. 
109) Id. 
110) Id. at 556-57. 
111) Id. at 557. 
112) Id. 
113) Id.
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   2. Opposing Arguments for Use of Genetic Information by Insurers 
  Many arguments against insurers' use of genetic information are presented and 
now I will review these arguments in turn, according to Holmes' description.
a. Use and Availability of Genetic Information Is Subject to Abuse 
  The first argument asserts that the use of genetic information by insurers "would 
produce essentially unfair discrimination and unfair results." It is alleged that 
"[i]njecting genetic risk information into insurance underwriting will result in ever 
more refined classifications and ratings, thereby increasing the difficulty for many 
applicants in obtaining affordable health and health-related insurance 
coverages."114) This is because "the only individuals allowed to purchase 
reasonably priced health and health-related insurance coverages are those who are 
born with 'healthy genes'." Accordingly, "[a]llowing insurers either to mandate 
genetic testing of applicants or to have access to an applicant's voluntary genetic 
tests can lead to abuses that will result in unfair discrimination." 115) 
  Holmes refers to many cases where applicants who are asymptomatic or whose 
family member carries a defective gene were rejected health insurance or denied 
coverage including a shocking example in which a young, healthy, and productive 
attorney was denied insurance coverage totally because of the reason that her father 
may have Huntington's disease.116) 
  This argument is based on the observation that there is a "noteworthy 
différence" between ordinary medical tests "which reveal the existence of an extant 
disease or physical condition" and genetic tests "which indicate the presence of 
genes which may, at some future time and under specific conditions, cause a 
disease."117) For example "if an individual is ... found to have an elevated 
cholesterol level and a poor result on an exercise EKG [electrocardiogram] ... [and] 
indicate ... high risk for a heart attack. .. she may be denied coverage ... based on 
sound actuarial analysis." However, it is alleged that "[i]f he [another individual] 
tests positive for this gene [heart disease], but he is a healthy individual, he should 
not be denied health insurance based solely on the fact that he possesses this 
gene."118) This is because of the reason that "[t]his individual may choose to alter 
his lifestyle, diet, exercise, and alcohol consumption with the knowledge that the
114) Id. at 558. 
115) Id. 
116) Id. at 560-61. 
117) Id. at 562. 
118) Id.
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gene is present, and his actions may help prevent he onset of heart disease."1 19) 
  Moreover, it is asserted that current genetic tests are stiil experimental nd yield 
information of uncertain applicability and thus "[g]enetic tests, at this early stage, 
can offer insurers no more information than they could already obtain by requesting 
a detailed family history" and therefore, using genetic tests is likely to be subject o 
abuse by insurers.120)
b. Unfair Discrimination in Insurance Pricing and Availability
   i. Insurance Requires Fair Redistribution, Not Fair Discrimination 
  This argument is based on the concept of fairness which centers on the "freedom 
to choice" and "right of voluntary choice" and alleges as follows:
Unlike smoking, or other bad habits used in efficient risk classifications, 
a person's genetic nature is entirely beyond that person 's voluntary 
choice. One has the capacity to improve bad habits and develop good 
habits, but one's genetic circumstance cannot be improved or enhanced 
through willful effort in the same way that skills or talents can be 
improved. Since one cannot choose one's genetic make-up, arguably 
there should be no duty to pay more for insurance because of a poor 
genetic make-up. The nature and purpose of insurance is risk 
transference and distribution, or fairly redistributing and equally sharing 
the fortuitous risks among all policyholders. Fair risk sharing is a 
fundamental insurance principle. Fair risk redistribution is a matter of 
equal faimess for all of us because all of us are genetically unequal.121)
  Consequently, it is asserted that "[b]ecause genetic différences are morally 
arbitrary, the notion of good or bad genetic luck ought not be the reason that one 
person receives better or worse insurance treatment than other people. Everyone 
deserves health care regardless of genetic luck."122) It is alleged that this argument 
is supported by the peoples' belief that "they should not be burdened with bad luck 
in the genetic draw."123)
119) Id. 
120) Id. at 562-63. 
121) Id. at 563-64 (emphases added). 
122) Id. at 564. 
123) Id.
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       ii. Misunderstanding and Misuse of Genetic Information 
  This argument emphasizes the uniqueness of genetic testing and its result and is 
based on the assumption of the différence between genetic tests and other 
traditional diagnostic tests such as X-ray or electrocardiograms, etc. 
  The nature of genetic information is différent from other non-genetic 
information which has been used by insurance pricing and availability in the sense 
that "[o]nce a defective gene is detected within a family, all of the relatives are 
stigmatized asbeing ill or having the disease, even where no other elative ver 
manifesta clinical signs of the disease."124) 
  It is alleged that "[t]hereare also many différences between genetic tests and the 
many diagnostic tests performed by physicians upon which insurers routinely rely 
to assess risks."125) The diagnostic tests "reveal the presence or absence of specific 
chemicals, tructures, or functions which indicate the presence or absence of a 
particular disorder". However, genetic tests are différent in the following senses:
Genetic tests can only indicate if an individual is either a carrier of a 
disease, or if she has a predisposition to developing a particular disorder. 
Even if a test reveals the presence of a single gene which causes a 
specific disorder, the test does not indicate when, if ever, the disease may 
actually be manifested, and genetic tests do not indicate how severe the 
disease might be if it ever does develop. ... [t]here is no certainty that 
she will ever become symptomatic and develop disease. In addition, 
many genetically controlled diseases are multigenic/multifactorial in
origin, and an individual may not possess all the genes necessary for a 
disease to express itself.126)
  Consequently, it is alleged that there is a high possibility to misunderstand and 
misuse genetic information,
                  iii. Availability of Insurance 
  Another argument insists that given the escalating costs of health care, using 
genetic information in the process of insurance underwriting deprives people who 
have bad genetic luck of the availability of insurance and health care itself.
124) Id. at 566. 
125) Id. 
126) Id. at 566-67.
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This is allegedly because of the following reason:
Insurance has become an integral part of our health care system, and a 
denial of health insurance, for many, may be the equivalent of a denial of 
health care itself. Individuals who are denied health insurance based on 
their genetic make-up may refuse to seek medical care because of an 
inability to pay for it.127)
  At the saure time, this argument asserts that this consequence results -in adverse 
effect on insurance companies as well: "Such inaction then shifts the burden of 
providing health care to the taxpayer, which is what the insurance industry has 
attempted to avoid in lobbying against a national health care system."128)
c. Prohibiting the Use of Genetic Information Protects Individual Right to 
  Privacy 
  The last category of the argument against the use of genetic information by 
insurers that Holmes describes is based on the concept of individual right of 
privacy. This argument consists of three assertions: 1) using genetic information 
can cause stigmatization and psychological trauma; 2) confidentiality must be 
protected; and 3) preferred social ignorance. This argument alleges that:
  Genetic testing and the subsequent use of immutable, potentially 
stigmatizing genetic information may create a suspect genetic 
underclass, the 'genetically inferior,' in insurance rating classifications 
and thereby constitute unfair discrimination as a matter of law. Such 
discrimination based on an individual's genome should be prohibited as 
a violation of the individual's civil rights.129)
  Consequently, it is asserted that "[p]rotecting privacy interests by restricting 
insurers' unrestrained access to an individual's genetic information is a matter of 
basic civil and legal rights. Therefore, any state or federal law authorizing 
mandatory genetic screening for insurance purposes would violate an applicant's 
constitutional right to privacy."130)
127) Id. ai 567. 
128) Id. 
129) Id. at 569. 
130) Id. at 570-71.
42 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 54:13
L Genetic Information Can Cause Stigmatization and Psychological Trauma 
  It is alleged that since there is a genetic ignorance of the third parties, "[a]n 
inappropriate disclosure of genetic information may stigmatize an individual for 
life, causing serious emotional, financial, and perhaps physical harm."131) 
Moreover, it is asserted that "genetic screening can cause psychological trauma. 
Genetic knowledge may have a devastating psychological impact on individuals 
who are told that they will develop a fatal, incurable disease."132) A historical 
evidence is referred to where the screening program of mandating carrier status of 
African-Americans for sickle-cell anemia was administered in some states in the 
early 1970s. 
  Contrary to ordinary diagnostic tests, genetic tests are more likely to cause 
psychological trauma because of the reason that "when an individual is informed 
that she may develop an incurable illness at some indeterminate ime in the future, 
this information may adversely impact her decisions about education, work, 
marriage, having children, aborting a pregnancy, and so forth."133) It is alleged that 
this is supported by the statistical evidence that "the suicide rate is four times 
greater among patients diagnosed with Huntington's disease than among the 
corresponding American Caucasian population." 134) 
  It is alleged that the "[f]ear of 'stigmatization, job lors, becoming uninsurable, 
or a heightened personal anxiety' are all valid reasons for asserting a 'right not to 
know'."135) Moreover, an adverse ffect of this fear is asserted:
Individuals who fear losing or being denied health insurance may refuse 
to seek testing. ... People may refuse to undergo genetic testing to 
determine compatibility with a relative who requires an organ transplant, 
for fear that the test results may be obtained by insurers and used to deny 
health care. This may, in turn, result in a decrease of potential donors 
who are willing te, involve themselves in the screening process. 136)
131) Id. at 572. 
132) Id. 
133) Id. at 573. 
134) Id. (data is relying on Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attenipted Suicide in Huntington Disease: 
    Implications for Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J. MED. GENETics 305,305-11 
  (1986)). 
135) Id. at 574 (original quotation is Dennis Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human 
    Genonie Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 165 (1992)). 
136) Id. at 574.
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              ii. Confidentiality Must Be Protected 
  Another argument based on the right of privacy alleges that the confidentiality 
of genetic information must be protected given "the immutable nature of genetic 
status" and computer-assisted data bank. It is alleged:
Insurers utilize systems of national data batiks that allow them to keep 
track of those individuals who have tested positive for certain disease.... 
Insurers exchange information about people through the Medical 
Information Bureau ("MIB"), a data batik that contains medical 
information about insurance applicants....If genetic information makes 
its way into these files without the appropriate legislation in place to 
control the manner in which the information can be used, the results will 
be devastating. 137)
                  iii. Preferred Social Ignorance 
  The final argument which supports the right to privacy is derived from 
"preferred social ignorance". It is stated that "[w]e can control our health to a 
certain extent through voluntary lifestyle choices: exercising, refraining from 
smoking, and developing healthier habits. On the order hand, we cannot control our 
genes."138) And this uncontrollable nature of genetic draw leads people to likely 
make the decision that "we may choose to live behind what the philosopher John 
Rawls refers to as the 'veil of ignorance'." 139) Holmes states the implication of this 
Rawisian theory of justice in the genetic discourse as follows:
Rawlsians posit a hypothetical state during which citizens do mot know 
their race, their class, or their genetic make-up. Standing behind this veil 
of ignorance before the formation of the social contract, people would 
most likely not select rules that penalize individuals based on arbitrarily, 
or fortuitously, assigned characteristics such as genetic diseases. In this 
hypothetical initial position, all citizens have a common interest in 
obtaining health insurance. .. [E]ach citizen would perceive himself or 
herself as potentially in the "worse-off' insurance rating classification
137) Id. at 575. 
138) Id. at 576-77. 
139) Id. at 577 (referring to Marc A. Lappe, Justice and the Limitations of Genetic Knowledge, in 
    JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappe eds., 
   1994)).
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and prefer, in self-interest, to protect the interest of those insurance 
applicants most disadvantaged by risk classification. 140)
  Consequently, it is alleged that our preferred social ignorance is a ground to 
support the right to genetic privacy, and hence, the use of genetic information by 
insurers should be forbidden legally.
D. Richard A. Epstein 
      Libertarian Argument: Open Access to Genetic Information 
 -Anti-Discrimination Laws Create Fraud, Deception, and Concealment
  One of the strongest heoretical arguments criticizing the anti-discrimination 
laws protecting genetic information is presented by Richard A. Epstein. In this 
section, I review his libertarian arguments. 
  The first thing I should noteis that in Epstein's framework, the issue concerning 
genetic information is not a new problem since as his article's subtitle Old 
Responses to New Technology shows, in his view, the genetic discrimination issue 
is nothing différent from other types of traditional discrimination such as race or 
gender discrimination. Thus, Epstein applies his analytic framework that he 
addressed in basic discrimination to the issues concerning enetic discrimination 
  According to his framework, to support anti-discrimination laws means to 
justify fraud and deception or concealment and therefore it is unfair. And also anti-
discrimination laws result in situations where "positive rights destroys negative 
liberties."141) Epstein asserts that "current anti-discrimination laws should be 
repealed insofar as they apply to private competitive mployment market."142) He 
relies on "libertarian bent" and explains "why a system of free entry and open 
markets can better cope with invidious forms of discrimination in employment 
markets than any system of government mandated and forced norms."143) In the 
view of Epstein, government intervention is justified only if it has valid reasons: 
"(1) to counter the use of private aggression; (2) to limit the operation and influence 
of private monopolies; and (3) to provide for classical public goods that cannot be 
supplied by a network of contractual arrangements, given the risk of holdout and
140) Id. 
141) Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of'Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New 
    Technology, 74 B.U.L. Rsv. 1, 14 (1994). 
142) Id. at 1. 
143) Id.
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strategic bargaining."144) However, antidiscrimination laws satisfy none of these 
criteria. 
  Here, let me review the details of his arguments. First of all, Epstein formulates 
the basic issue as "the question to be faced by society is whether the state, 
employers, and insurers ... should be allowed to take into account genetically 
derived information that reveals an individual's prospects for future disease and 
incapacity."145) Then, he states that "[a]t a theoretical level, the issue is what 
should be done to regulate the flow of information that indicates that persons have, 
or are susceptible to, certain kinds of genetic disease."146) The starting point of 
Epstein's argument rests on his understanding that genetic discrimination is "the 
inescapable issue and truth,"147) and thus the key question at stake is "[w]hat kind 
of response is appropriate?"148) His following arguments are addressed in order to 
reject anti-discrimination laws as an appropriate response. 
  For Epstein, the implication of supporting antidiscrimination laws means 
nothing différent from admitting fraud and misrepresentation legally. 
  Epstein asserts that antidiscrimination laws create asymmetrical information and 
adverse selection will'be triggered, and insurance companies will behave to protect 
themselves in the following way:
A person who knows that he is at risk for Huntington's disease has a 
strong incentive to acquire life and health insurance for the condition. 
This is because the expected payoffs are far greater than the stated 
premiums, which are based on the life expectancy and health needs of 
ordinary persons. Once this asymmetry is known to insurance 
companies, they have a counterincentive to equalize the information so 
that they can either avoid the risk altogether or charge a premium 
commensurate with its severity. 149)
  On the other hand, Epstein points out a paternalistic merit of genetic tests on 
behalf of all at-risk individuals of the genetic disease:
144) Id. at 1-2. 
145) Id. at 2-3. 
146) Id. at 6. 
147) Id. at 2-7. 
148) Id. at 5. 
149) Id. at 9-10.
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Uncertainty places enormous burdens on all at-risk individuals, including 
those who are actually free of the [Huntington's] disease. But with a 
perfect and costless test, fifty percent of the at-risk people will have a 
great weight lifted from their shoulders and will be able to lead normal 
lives from that point on. And what of the fifty percent who receive a 
death warrant? First note that the test does not cause the disease; it only 
delivers the bad message. Yet that message is not all bad. With the 
knowledge of the certain eventual onset of the disease in hand, extensive 
planning may be done-even absent information about exact date of 
onset. 150)
  Epstein asserts that "the plea for privacy is often a plea for the 
misrepresent one's self to the rest of the world."151) He asserts that:
right to
  False statements about or deliberate concealment of genetic 
information is as much a fraud as false statements about or concealment 
of any other issue. The only possible justification for concealment, 
therefore, would be that it is unfair for the person with the pending 
disorder to deal alone with the suffering and financial oss. Yet, that loss 
is not sustained because of the wrong of another.152)
  Epstein insists that "genetic discrimination raises problems no different from 
those associated with any other sort of misfortune, and calls for no different 
response. The greater knowledge that cornes from testing increases the information 
asymmetries that are always the bane of insurance markets."153) Therefore, he 
states that "[f]ull disclosure of material information in response to direct questions 
is an indispensable part of that [insurance] system."154) He also asserts that "[t]he 
person who wants privacy need not apply for the position or the insurance 
coverage. But he should not be able to have it both ways, and at someone else's 
expense."155) 
  Moreover, Epstein asserts that "the prohibition against genetic discrimination
150) Id. at 10. 
151) Id. at 12. 
152) Id. at 13. 
153) Id. 
154) Id. 
155) Id.
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should be seen for what it is-an elaborate set of cross-subsidies that reduces the 
total level of social wealth as it transfers wealth between parties .-156) 
  Epstein notes that employers do not discriminate against employees without any 
good reason:
  Employers have no incentive to discriminate against workers whose 
genetic conditions do not impose any cost, present or future, against 
them. Insurers have no incentive to discriminate against applicants 
whose genetic conditions pose no future risk. But both of these groups 
do have strong incentives to discriminate against parties who do pose 
greater risks. Efforts to keep genetic information secret do not make 
sense because employers and insurers are irrational.157)
   Thus, Epstein asserts that "anti-discrimination principles have forced employers 
to behave irrationally by requiring them to ignore the known cost differentials of 
employing certain groups."158) He notes that this is also true in the insurance 
setting, that is, "[i]f a person is a carrier of a deleterious gene, and the person's 
offspring are covered under a proposed insurance contract, a decision by the insurer 
not to cover is not irrational, given the greater costs that are imposed."159) Epstein 
also mentions that in the adoption context, it seems "wholly inappropriate to ignore 
genetic information."' 6() And he asserts that "serious criminal sanctions hould be 
imposed on anyone who misrepresents his health status on an issue [adoption] of 
this importance." 161) 
  Consequently, Epstein asserts that anti-discrimination laws force employers and 
insurers to behave irrationally and result in creating "implicit cross-subsidies." He 
concludes, therefore, that anti-discrimination laws are not appropriate responses to 
genetic discrimination. 
  Then, what Epstein suggests as alternative proposais or responses which deal 
with the question of genetic discrimination are: 1) "do nothing collectively at ail, at 
least through the government" and rest on "charitable efforts" made for 
handicapped; 2) expect "technical innovation" which "can produce new workplace
156) Id. at 18. 
157) Id. 
158) Id. 
159) Id. at 19. 
160) Id. 
161) Id.
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equipment that will assist disabled workers to assume more productive lives."162) 
  As I have seen, Epstein points out the hidden colts and implicit cross-subsidies 
with which employers and insurers are forced to be burdened ue to the structure of 
imperfect and asymmetrical information resulted from anti-discrimination laws. 
And he asserts that "[t]he subsidies must be made overt, and they must be in the 
form of direct charges against he public purse."163) If the government interfères 
legally with employment or insurance contract by anti-discrimination laws, he 
continues to state that "the government should fund the additional costs associated 
with hiring or insuring individuals with genetic defects." For example, "[i]f that 
cost [hiring or insuring people who have genetic defects] is $10,000 per year, and 
the cost of hiring or insuring ordinary workers is $1,000 per year, then government 
should fund the $9,000 différence from general revenues." 164)
  Epstein describes three différences between tax route (subsidy tax) and anti-
discrimination law: 1) "the anti-discrimination laws certainly cannot guarantee that 
social burdens will be distributed uniformly over society"; 2) "the use of the anti-
discrimination law is likely to increase the total amount of expenditures for dealing 
with genetic discrimination beyond what they would be with a system of taxes and 
subsidies"; 3) "the anti-discrimination approach often leads to the adoption of 
general and neutral rules that are inefficient for the firm and society at large." 165) 
  As you may see, the bottom line in his argument is that anti-discrimination laws 
generate normous costs that employers and insurers have to be burdened with. 
And it is not fair to impose such costs on them, and the burdens should be 
distributed uniformly over society. Epstein concludes by stating:
  [T]he economics literature points out the difficulties that arise when 
parties have to make joint decisions on the basis of imperfect and 
asymmetrical information. A sound system of law should allow parties 
to eliminate both forms of bias in making their decisions. The present 
attack on genetic discrimination only exacerbates these problems.166)
  Regardless of whether or not we agree with libertarian arguments, what we have 
to take seriously from Epstein's argument is the inescapable question of who would
162) Id. at 20. 
163) Id. at 20-21. 
164) Id. at 21. 
165) Id. 
166) Id. at 22.
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compensate the costs given as a consequence of passing anti-discrimination laws. 
Next, I review one of the latest arguments which discuss this issue.
E. Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen (Economic Analysis Approach)
  One of the recent strong arguments criticizing legal prohibition on using genetic 
information is presented by Diver and Cohen. Here, I review their arguments 
addressed in their recent article rhetorically titled "Genophobia: What Is Wrong 
With Genetic Discrimination?" 
  First of all, their argument is the same as the arguments presented by law and 
economics theorists, that is, antidiscrimination laws diminish allocative efficiency 
which is one of the most important values in the open market. They begin by 
explaining the open market function:
  Voluntary exchange between two willing and informed individuals is 
the paradigm of efficiency-enhancing transactions....according to most 
versions of utilitarian or social welfarist ethics, society should not only 
permit, but indeed encourage, its members to engage in voluntary 
transactions. Any form of government regulation, such as a prohibition 
on "genetic discrimination," that interfères with the terms on which 
individuals may contract, is thus presumptively efficiency reducing.... 
"Market failures" such as coercion
, information asymmetries, or harmful 
externalities may cause individuals to enter into transactions that reduce 
their own welfare or that of thid parties". 167)
  They argue that antidiscrimination laws create "information asymmetries" 
because these laws prohibit one contract party such as insurers and employers from 
accessing enetic information of another party who has the genetic information. On 
the other hand, another ide of this argument, free access to genetic information 
enhances allocative efficiency in the market. 
  In the angle of open market, they assert "[i]nformation from genetic testing can 
improve the efficiency of health insurance markets by enabling insurers to classify 
risks more accurately and thus equate the price of coverage to its value." 168)
167) Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With Genetic 
    Discrimination? 149 U. PA. L. Rev. 1439, 1460 (2001). 
168) Id. at 1465.
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Persons who know that they are in an elevated risk category will thus 
have an even stronger incentive than at present to increase their 
insurance coverage, so long as insurers are unable to identify them in 
advance as high-risk and are therefore unable to place them in 
appropriate risk classifications. 169)
  Diver and Cohen discuss that without using genetic information, "by using such 
techniques as medical underwriting, exclusion of preexisting conditions, and the 
structure of deductibles and coinsurance provisions," insurance companies cannot 
"combat the allocative distortions caused by adverse selection" or "information 
asymmetry."170) Consequently, they assert that "the asymmetrical treatment of 
genetic information by the incoming privacy regime [legal prohibition on insurers' 
using genetic information] almost surely diminishes the allocative efficiency of 
individual health insurance markets." 17 1) They support "a market premised on full 
transparency of genetic information." 172)
  Next, Diver and Cohen criticize the one common argument delivered by 
proponents of genetic antidiscrimination laws asserting that free access to the 
genetic information discourages genetic testing. They summarize the argument 
from privacy advocates.
[W]elfare losses caused by distortion of employment and insurance 
markets will be offset by welfare gain produced by removing an 
impediment to genetic testing. ...many people are likely to be 
discouraged from seeking genetic testing for fear that adverse results will 
be disclosed to, or demanded by, prospective mployers and insurers.... 
a legal prohibition on the use of genetic tests data in insurance and 
employment would thus unleash the therapeutic and ameliorative 
benefits that could flow from widespread use of predictive genetic 
testing.173)
Diver and Cohen object to this argument by stating:
169) Id. at 1466. 
170) Id. at 1466-67. 
171) Id. at 1467. 
172) Id. at 1468. 
173) Id. at 1468-69.
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When a person decides not to undergo genetic testing, she is presumably 
deciding that her net utility would be reduced: that is, that the costs 
(including not only the direct colt of undergoing the testing, but also the 
expected adverse impact that the resulting knowledge would produce on 
both her economic prospects and her psychological state) outweigh the 
benefits (in terms of the improvement in her, and perhaps her 
offspring's, health that could result from ameliorative actions).' 74)
  Consequently, they conclude that "the encouragement of genetic testing does not 
provide a convincing welfare-based argument o prohibit the use of genetic test 
results in employment or insurance."175) 
  Next, the argumentwhich supports legal protection on genetic information by 
resorting to equality of opportunity is considered. This argument is based on 
distributive justice deriving from egalitarian ethics stating that "every human being 
deserves an equal opportunity to achieve her potential or her life goals and that a 
just society, therefore, bas a moral obligation to redress barriers to equal 
opportunity."176) 
  The argument based on equality of opportunity is as follows:
[I]ndividuals hould not suffer social disadvantages a  a result of factors 
beyond their control. A person's success in the "race of life" should be 
determined, not by the "brute luck" of the natural or social lottery, but 
only by the extent to which she uses her talents and opportunities. One 
deserves, by this account, only what one chooses. One does not morally 
deserve unchosen and uncontrollable attributes, nor the adverse 
consequences that flow from possessing such attributes. 177)
  They call this argument "the brute luck version of egalitarianism" which 
"implies that the genetically unlucky should have a claim to some sort of 
compensatory treatment to offset their innate disadvantage." 178) 
  Their objection to this argument is addressed as follows:
174) Id. at 1469. 
175) Id. at 1470. 
176) Id. at 1471. 
177) Id. (the phrase "brute luck" is labeled by Thomas Scanlon. Sec FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: 
    GENETICS & JUSTICE 67 (Allen Buchanan et al., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
178) Id. at 1471-72.
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[A] job applicant obtains a job despite knowing-and, indeed, 
concealing-information that would reveal limitations on productivity. 
The advantage gained by such a person cornes at the expense of not only 
the employer, but also another disappointed job applicant who is 
presumably better qualified for the job. Indeed, if a ban on using genetic 
information makes it more difficult for employers to verify the accuracy 
of the health-related questions that they are permitted by law to ask, then 
the policy may have the consequence of benefiting the dishonest at the 
expense of the honest. Likewise, adverse selection in insurance 
penalizes not only the insurance company, but also other insured 
persons, a portion of whose premiums must contribute to the subsidy.179)
  Here, a rhetorical question is posed of "[h]ow, then, can a victim of genetic 
misfortune be considered morally entitled to demand employment or insurance, at 
the cost of corporations or individuels who have, by hypothesis, neither caused her 
genetic impairment nor consented to bear responsibility for its alleviation?"180) 
  As Diver and Cohen point out, antidiscrimination laws force not only employers 
and insurance companies but also other honest or healthy insureds or job applicants 
or employees to take the burden of costs resulting from prohibition on using genetic 
information. Therefore, one implication of the antidiscrimination laws is to admit 
an unfairness between the parties. Who and which institution should have to be 
burdened with the cost resulting from antidiscrimination laws is an open question 
that needs to be answered. This issue will be discussed in the latter part of this 
paper. 
  They also criticize the arguments resorting to necessity of health insurance and 
invidious discrimination resulting from free access to genetic information. 
  According to Diver and Cohen,
[t]he brute luck version of equal opportunity argues that a just society 
should readjust he point from which the genetically unlucky begin the 
race. One plausible way to accomplish this objective is to provide to 
every individual at least a minimal allotment of goods and services 
deemed indispensable to the pursuit of life's goal. Among such goods 
and services, so it could be argued, are health insurance and
179) Id, at 1472. 
180) Id.
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employment. ...in the context of contemporary America, health 
insurance and employment should be considered as essential ingredients 
of a decent life. In a world of unpredictable health risks and highly 
specialized, expensive health care, health insurance should be understood 
as an essential means of protecting people against crippling financial 
losses.... 181)
  Diver and Cohen give three objections to this argument. The first reason of 
objection is that necessity does not justify compelled altruism: they state that"[i]f a 
drowning man canne demand that a passer-by save his life-the ultimate 
"necessity"-why can a genetically, disfavored person demand that a particular 
insurer offer him subsidized insurance or a particular employer offer him a 
subsidized job?"182) 
  The second reason they present is resorting to people's diversity of preferences. 
They state that "individuals ... attach differing values to goods such as health 
insurance coverage or employment.... [For example,] [t]hose who are severely 
genetically disadvantaged ... might place an especially high value on access to high-
limit health, disability, or even life insurance [but] [t]hose who are mildly 
disadvantaged might place a higher value on access to a high-paying or particularly 
secure job. [Therefore, they assert hat] the ethically superior means of providing 
even 'necessities' is a cash subsidy, not merit goods [blanket banning on using 
genetic information]". 183) 
  Their third reasonseems to be derived from the second reason and based on 
their belief that "even if one accepts that society has an obligation to provide 
employment and health insurance protection, the antidiscrimination strategy [laws] 
is particularly ill-suited to serving that goal." 
  In the context of health insurance, "egalitarians have argued that the state should 
provide every citizen protection against he consequences of the most common and 
devastating of health risks."184) They agree to what they called this minimum-
benefit approach to equal opportunity. However, they do not agree to the argument 
asserting that to achieve this goal, antidiscrimination laws are appropriate means, 
and insist that "[a]ssuming that some minimal level of health insurance coverage is 
a necessity, the government should provide the benefit directly, as it does (albeit
181) Id. at 1473-74. 
182) Id. at 1474. 
183) Id. 
184) Id. at 1475.
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imperfectly) in the Medicare or Medicaid program, or indirectly through some form 
of subsidy or tax benefit."185)
  The prohibitionist strategy [argument supporting antidiscrimination 
laws]...provides a (hidden) subsidy to any person who might be 
discriminated against for genetic reasons, regardless of financial or other 
need. More importantly, the antidiscrimination policy subsidizes the 
purchase of any level of insurance that the beneficiary might choose to 
obtain, not merely some basic minimum level of coverage. Because the 
value of the implicit subsidy surely increases as the level of coverage 
increases, such a policy gives beneficiaries an incentive to consume far 
more than the level of coverage that any plausible egalitarian theory 
would deem minimally necessary. It is as though the govemment sought 
to combat malnutrition by requiring all food-service establishments, 
from the neighborhood soup kitchen to the Michelin three-star restaurant, 
to give the malnourished a fifty percent discount on the price of every 
meal. 186)
  Diver and Cohen also raise an objection to the argument asserting that genetic 
information is closely akin to other forms of morally condemned invidious 
discrimination. According to this argument, "discrimination on genetic 
grounds ...is morally indistinguishable from other forms of discrimination, such as 
racial or gender discrimination, that are widely condemned. These latter forms of 
discrimination are, after all, based on genetic attributes."187) 
  However, Diver and Cohen present a counterargument by stating as follows:
Consider intelligence-a trait, or rather a congeries of cognitive 
information storage and processing abilities, with undeniable genetic 
roots. If genetic discrimination were per se immoral, how could we 
possibly condone the nearly universal use of intelligence measures in 
education, employment, and other settings? The came could be said for 
other attributes such as aggressiveness, tature, obesity, or physical 
beauty. 188)
185) Id. 
186) Id. 
187) Id. at 1475-76. 
188) Id. at 1477.
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They go on further to assert:
  Indeed, the labeling of a condition as a "disease" often reduces social 
stigma attached to a condition or pattern of behavior. Consider the 
characterization of alcoholism as a disease, the relabeling of "senility" as 
Alzheimer's disease, or the emerging consensus that obesity has a strong 
genetic comportent. 189)
  In sum, as I have seen, Diver and Cohen assert the genetic privacy protecting 
regime is sot an appropriate choice of means to provide redress for genetic 
inequalities. They suggest a regime of "genetic transparency," a policy 
dissemination f information as a morally attractive alternative r sponse to genetic 
inequality. They conclude that "only a regime of genetic transparency can enable 
our society to confront openly its phobias about genetic diversity and begin, at last, 
fully to appreciate its blessings."190)
III. Adverse Selection
  In this Section, I examine the so-called "adverse selection" issue because, as we 
have seen in the arguments of every commentator in the previous sections, it has 
been referred to as one of the most compelling justifications for using genetic 
information in the insurance arena and it would be one of the most persuasive 
grounds against anti-discrimination laws. 
  As discussed before, genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws have practical and 
normative problems which stem from genetic exceptionalism. I pointed out that if 
we intend to prohibit genetic discrimination, the law should be designed to forbid 
the use of all predictive medical information because in practice it is impossible to 
distinguish genetic information from other medical information, and moreover in 
theory it is sot morally equal and fair to protect only individuals with genetic health 
problems and not protect individuals with non-genetic health problems against 
discrimination. Therefore, I argued that the real issue that we have to discuss 
seriously is whether or not we should prohibit legally the insurers and employers 
from obtaining and using all predictive medical information in their decisions in 
order to prevent discrimination. However, as I stated before, this is or should be an
189) Id. at 1478. 
190) Id. at 1482.
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open question because the present and the long-standing health insurance system in 
the U.S. has taken predictive medical information into consideration in the 
underwriting process, and it has been regarded as actuarial fairness to do so. Thus, 
banning the use of ail predictive medical information means a paradigm shift of the 
entire present insurance system.191) The question here is whether this paradigm 
shift is justifiable or not. To answer this question, we have to examine the reasons 
of both rides of the argument for and against using all predictive medical 
information. One of the prudent approaches to explore this issue seems to be in 
examining the implication and consequences if the law prohibits the use of all 
predictive medical information. One of such consequences i caused by adverse 
selection.
A. Practical Problems of Adverse Selection
  As we have seen in the arguments in the previous sections, adverse selection is 
referred to as "the greater tendency of those posing a comparatively high risk to 
seek insurance than those posing a comparatively low risk."192) Or it means "that 
people who have undergone testing and have tested positive for a genetic disorder 
will attempt to buy as much insurance as they can to cover the cost of future illness 
when the genetic disorder expresses itself."193) Adverse selection occurs when the 
law prohibits insurers from considering future risk-predictive medical information 
of policyholders. 
  Kirke D. Weaver addresses the scenario of adverse selection with a good 
example.
  For instance, many individuals do not generally think about the 
possibility of catastrophic illnesses like Alzheimer's disease. Therefore, 
they do not purchase long-term nursing home care insurance, that would 
provide for extended nursing home residency. However, if an individual 
discovers that they have a genetic abnormality which increases his or her 
chance to develop Alzheimer's disease, that individual will be more 
likely to purchase long-term nursing home care insurance. A simple
191) See, e.g., Lainie Friedman Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigni Shift: Lessons Froni HIV, 
   29 J.L. MED. & ETrlncs 141 (2001). 
192) Kenneth S. Abraham, Understanding Prohibitions Against Genetic Discrimination in Insurance, 
   40 JURIMETRICS J. 123, 125 n.4. (1999). 
193) T. H. Cushing, supra note 28, at 254 (1993).
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example involves life insurance. Many individuals do not purchase life 
insurance or purchase very little, because death seems like such a remote 
possibility. However, individuals who discover that they have an 
increased risk of developing breast cancer or could develop Huntington's 
disease have a greater incentive to purchase life insurance coverage in 
order to help provide for their family after their death. These individuals 
will purchase more insurance because of an increase in their perceived 
need for the coverage. Furthermore, the individuals will attempt to obtain 
the insurance without informing the insurance company or their self-
insured employer of their condition, in order to obtain lower insurance 
rates. Because insurance companies determine the colt of their policies 
by calculating general risk patterns among large segments of the 
population, this increase in insurance coverage for high-risk individuals 
would force insurance companies to alter their rate structures for all 
insured individuals if the insuring companies were not permitted to 
inquire about genetic conditions. This over-insurance by genetically 
defective individuals causes lower risk individuals effectively to 
subsidize the health care of the higher risk, genetically defective 
individuals. If insurance companies cannot use genetic screening as part 
of their application processes, the companies will have no choice but to 
raise insurance rates for everyone. Therefore, employers could 
implement a policy of genetic monitoring or screening and potentially 
reduce the cost of insurance coverage. 194)
  Chetan Gulati describes the scenario f detrimental dverse consequences of 
adverse selection on the insurance industry as follows:
[N]ot knowing what their individual risk of needing expensive medical 
treatments will be, rational, risk-averse actors assume the worst-case 
scenario and purchase insurance accordingly. Therefore, individuals 
who know that they are very likely to develop a disease that will require 
costly medical services will have an incentive to purchase a "gold-
standard" insurance plan-or, will purchase "more insurance"-that will 
ensure that they will have first dollar coverage for the treatment of the
194) Kirke D. Weaver, 
   249-50 (1997).
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diseases they are most likely to develop. Even though this plan may 
have higher premiums, individuals armed with information of their own 
riskiness will enroll in it because it represents a savings over what they 
would have to pay out-of-pocket if they purchased a différent plan. 
Alternatively, individuals who know that they are unlikely to require 
expensive medical care, at least in the near future, may choose to 
purchase a cheaper, and less comprehensive plan. Therefore, individuals 
who get genetic screens and test negative for a variety of genetic 
disorders may elect to purchase less insurance. As high risks separate 
from low risks, the cyclical adverse consequences of that selection set in 
motion. The results of this cycle would be that premiums would rise and 
fewer people would be able to afford health insurance. Thus, adverse 
selection would likely result in catastrophic failures in the insurance 
industry. 195)
  I summarize this scenario in the following way: Legal prohibition on the use of 
predictive medical information creates asymmetry of negative genetic information 
on future risks --> high risk individuals buy more insurance disproportionately -> 
increase premiums of all policyholders to maintain the solvency of the insurance 
companies -> low-risk insureds leave the pool (plans) -> death (downward) spiral 
of premium set in motion ---> result in collapse of the insurance market -~ 
ultimately create many uninsured people. 
  Jeremy A. Colby presents counterarguments against insurers' adverse selection 
arguments:
First, the adverse selection argument assumes that low-risk insureds will 
discontinue their insurance coverage because of increased premiums, 
although there is no explanation of where low-risk insureds would get 
alternative risk management services. Second, insurers profitably insure 
the existing pool of insureds, a pool composed of the same low- and 
high- risk insureds whom they would ensure under a system not based on 
genetic information. Third, adverse selection would only affect the ten 
percent of the insurance market that is medically underwritten. Fourth, 
insurers may pool risk across the individual insurance market insureds
195) Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrintination Laws In Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 
   QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149, 184-85 (2001).
2007] ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GENETIC PRIVA CY PROTECTION LA WS 59
because "the actual financial losses for the pool will be close to the 
aggregate financial losses predicted for the pool by an insurance 
company." Finally, insurers may limit the effects of adverse selection by 
charging higher "unfair" premiums only for policies offering unusually 
rich benefits that most people would not opt for unless they knew of a 
genetic defect.196)
  Gulati also presents Pive principal arguments asserting that adverse selection 
will not have a significant impact on the commercial health insurance system:
(1) if all insurers are subjected to the laws, no single insurer will be 
disproportionately hurt and thus the cyclical consequences ... will be 
avoided; 
(2) low-risk insureds will not withdraw from the plans even if premiums 
increase; 
(3) because only a small percentage of the population would be affected 
by the laws, there would not be enough plan switching, or purchasing of 
more insurance to create adverse selection problems; 
(4) adverse selection problems will be limited to highly specialized plans 
that priced anticipating selection; and 
(5) the fact that states have passed genetic antidiscrimination laws 
without suffering the force of adverse selection is proof that its impact is 
limited.' 97)
  However, Gulati asserts each of these propositions has flaws. According to 
Gulati, the first argument asserting that "adverse selection will not become 
problematic because all insurers will be equally affected, and thus no single insurer 
would be at a competitive disadvantage relative to other health insurers" is flawed 
for the following reasons.
Initially, it presupposes federal, uniform, regulation, including that of 
self-insured plans. If only insurance companies regulated by the states 
are not allowed to differentiate, they will end up with a larger proportion
196) Jeremy A. Colby, Note & Comment, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation 
   Proposed by the I05th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 461-62 (1998). 
197) Chetan Gulati, supra note 195, at 185-86 (2001) (citing Jeremy A. Colby, Note and Comment, 
    supra note 196.
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of the highest risk population, putting them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
self-insurance. Also, companies that have healthier workforces and are 
enrolled in group plans will have an incentive to withdraw from those 
plans and to self-insure. In addition, any uneven distribution of high-risk 
individuals in a particular plan could start an irreversible adverse 
selection cycle. A particular insurance company, by chance or by having 
a plan that is attractive to those at high risk, could end up with a 
disproportionate pool of high-risk individuals. If this imbalance occurs, 
these plans will be unable to prevent the addition of more high-risk 
individuals using price différentiation. Thus, they would have to change 
their scope of coverage or raise the premiums for all of their enrollees. 
As a consequence, low-risk insureds will have an incentive to switch 
plans and the price of the plan will spiral upwards. Finally, there is still 
the problem that accompanies the purchase of more insurance by high 
risk individuals. Namely, if the law does not prevent high risk 
individuals from purchasing more insurance, the price of the insurance 
package goes up for all insureds and thus fewer people are able to afford 
to purchase insurance. 198)
  Gulati also notes that the second argument asserting that "adverse selection will 
be limited because low-risk insureds will not withdraw from their insurance plans 
when they are forced to pay increased premiums" is also dubious.
The immediate problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that 
some people would not be able to pay higher premiums. Additionally, 
this argument implicitly assumes that low-risk insureds would not have 
any attractive alternatives and therefore will remain in their plans and 
continue to pay the higher costs. This ignores the fact that low-risk 
individuals could pool among themselves by way of purchasing plans 
that are cheaper and do not provide first-dollar coverage for expensive 
medical treatments. In other words, they could pool themselves into 
plans that have more limited coverage and charge higher co-payments. 
These plans would be unattractive to an individual who knows that they 
have a predisposition to disease and may require very expensive care. 
Thus, even if every insurer is not allowed to differentiate, there are other
198) Id. at 186-87.
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ways in which the market can segregate individuals once those 
individuals are armed with the knowledge of their own genetic profile . 
In summation, the flaw in this argument is that it assumes that insureds 
have two choices, to be insured or uninsured , it ignores the myriad of 
options relating to the amount of insurance they purchase. 199)
  According to Gulati, the third argument asserting that "[t]he threat of adverse 
selection is also not suppressed by the fact that only ten percent of the insurance 
market is medically underwritten" is not persuasive for the following two reasons.
First, ... there is mounting evidence that because of the new economy 
and employers' desire to switch their employees into fixed contribution 
schemes, more people may soon be purchasing health insurance as 
individuals. The impact of more individual purchasers, whether they be 
individuals purchasing insurance with their own dollars or with their 
employers' dollars (vouchers), is that the market for health insurance 
will become more disaggregated thereby decreasing the mitigating 
impact of group purchasing on limiting adverse selection. In the case of 
fixed contribution systems, employees will have an opportunity oselect 
from a variety of plans and options. Thus, those employees that are 
aware that their own genetic profile, or the profile of one of their family 
members, puts them into a high-risk category will want to use their 
voucher to purchase a plan that gives them more comprehensive 
coverage. They will be willing to pay some of the premium out of 
pocket in order to secure this insurance. On the other hand, an employee 
who bas a clean bill of genetic health may be induced to purchase a less 
comprehensive plan. . . .The second . . . individuals may purchase 
supplemental or additional health insurance coverage if they know that 
they are particularly susceptible to illness. Thus, a person who finds out 
that hey have a high probability of developing a disease for which their 
insurance plan does not cover will have an incentive to either purchase 
supplemental insurance or an entirely separate individual policy. For 
example, those who learn that they will likely develop Alzheimer's 
disease will have a strong incentive to purchase long terra care.200)
199) Id. at 187-88. 
200) Id. at 188-89.
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  Moreover, Gulati argues that the fourth argument asserting that "insurers may 
limit the effects of adverse selection by charging higher 'unfair' premiums only for 
policies offering unusually rich benefits that mort people would not opt for unless 
they knew of a genetic defect" is also flawed.
Insurance rates are based, in large part, on the utilization of the average 
enrollee. Thus, if a policy that provided coverage for particular 
expensive treatments had the effect of only attracting those who knew 
that they were predisposed to need the treatments, the premiums for 
these policies would be so high that they would effectively price many of 
those who were genetically predisposed to disease out of the market. 
Therefore, the end result would be no différent than up-front genetic 
différentiation. 201)
  Furthermore, Gulati also argues that the fifth argument asserting "the fact that 
states have passed genetic antidiscrimination laws without suffering the force of 
adverse selection is proof that its impact is limited" is not persuasive "because of 
the limited empirical evidence that has been generated in states that have heretofore 
passed such laws."202)
While it is true that the kinds of adverse selection cycles described in this 
subsection have not been set in motion in these states, adverse selection 
remains a threat. One of the prerequisites for the triggering of adverse 
selection cycles is reliable knowledge about one's own genetic risks. As 
noted earlier, this information is currently unreliable and very expensive. 
Therefore, few people are using genetic test data to make decisions about 
which health plans to enroll in and how much insurance to buy. In 
addition, it is possible that the adverse selection cycles are underway but 
evidence of them is yet to surface. 203)
  Accordingly, Gulati concludes that "when the veil of ignorance is lowered on 
the side of the insureds and that same information is not available to insurers, 
adverse selection results."204) And "this adverse selection will drive up the price of
201) Id. at 189. 
202) Id. 
203) Id. at 189-90, 
204) Id. at 190.
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the insurance product, making it harder for those in the lower socioeconomic 
classes to purchase insurance. At worst, the adverse selection will be so strong that 
it will destroy the commercial health insurance system."205) 
  However, Mark A. Hall notes that "this [adverse selection] concem has greater 
force for life insurance than health insurance, because life insurance typically 
covers amuch longer subscription period, with guaranteed rights of renewal. Health 
insurance typically allows for annual changes in enrollment, price, and 
coverage."206) 
  Here, it is important to note that Kenneth S. Abraham points out three factors 
which distinguish ealth insurance from life and disability insurance. He regards 
each of these factors as the reason to support he justifications against health 
insurers' use of genetic information. 
  Abraham states that "adverse selection ismuch less likely to pose a problem in 
health than in life and disability insurance."207) He notes that "the magnitude ofa 
health insurer's exposure t , people who have in fact adversely selected isnaturally 
limited because health insurance provides indemnity only-reimbursement for 
actual loss. The insurer's exposure is limited by a policyholder's policy limits."208)
Contrary to this, "the threat of adverse selection in life insurance ... is far greater" 
because "[m]ost life insurance is sold on an individual, rather than group, basis" 
and also "life insurance typically is automatically renewable annually at the option 
of the policyholder" and "life insurance has no principle of indemnity that 
automatically limits the amount of the insurer's exposure to a policyholder."209) 
  The second factor that Abraham notes is that "much health insurance is sold on 
a group basis through large employers without individual underwriting. There is 
virtually no selection by these applicants, and therefore no adverse selection."210) 
  The third factor Abraham points out is "the view that health insurance is 
substantially différent in another important way from other voluntarily purchased 
private insurance" because "health insurance is a major vehicle through which the 
body politic is moving toward ensuring the universal availability of health care."211) 
In contrast, life and disability insurance "are much more discretionary, serving as
205) Id. 
206) Mark A. Hall, Insurers' Use of Genetic Information, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 13, 18 (1996). 
207) Kenneth S. Abraham, Understanding Prohibitions Against Genetic Discrimination in Insurance, 
   40 JURIMETRICS J. 123, 125 (1999). 
208) Id. 
209) Id. 
210) Id. at 126. 
211) Id.
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consumption items that différent individuals choose to purchase in différent 
quantities. Prohibiting life and disability insurers from screening applicants who 
pose a serious threat of adverse selection could seriously undermine insurers' 
solvency and thereby threaten the availability of these forms of insurance to the rest 
of the population."212)
  As has been seen, in the health insurance setting, the scenario of adverse 
selection does not seem to be serious. Without increasing premiums, insurance 
companies also can mitigate the adverse effects of adverse selection by using such 
measures as increasing deductibles or copayment, capping the maximum benefits, 
coinsurance provisions. 
  Whetheror not the perverse scenario f adverse selection legal prohibition 
creates asymmetry of negative genetic information on future risks - increase 
premiums of all policyholders -p low-risk insureds leave the pool (plans) -> death 
(downward) spiral of premium set in motion -> result in collapse of the insurance 
market - ultimately create many uninsured people will play out this way in 
reality is not certain at the present time because empirical data have not been 
accumulated to answer this. However, even though this scenario becomes true in 
reality, we can still assert why we have to protect the insurance industry if the 
present insurance system has a fondamental flaw in offering an opportunity to have 
access to minimum health care. To speak more boldly, why should we protect he 
health insurance industry at the expense of the many lives of the genetically 
unlucky people? The collapse of the private health insurance market is a big social 
problem and a serious policy concern as long as it results in creating many new 
uninsured people. However, if the Americans introduce a universal health 
insurance system as national social security, this concern would no longer exist. 
Some may still argue that, as the failure of the medical reform attempted by the 
Clinton administration proves, to establish a universal health insurance system in 
the short term can not be expected, and therefore, many new uninsured people 
would be created by the collapse of the private health insurance system. However, 
if the federal government could create some budget o rescue such uninsured people 
or could expand the eligibility of the covered entity under the Medicare and 
Medicaid program as temporal measures until a universal health insurance system is 
established, the concern for creating new uninsured people could be eliminated. To 
state it more ironically, it can be argued that it is even desirable if the present 
private health insurance system collapses because the Americans will be forced to
212) Id.
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establish a universal health insurance system and stop depriving the present and all 
prospective future people with genetic abnormality of obtaining health 
insurance.213) 
  However, even though adverse selection may not cause a downward spiral and 
the health insurance system should not be deemed to collapse, it raises a more 
serious normative problem concerning equality and distributive justice. Adverse 
selection creates cross-subsidization from low-risk (relatively having a clean bill of 
genetic health) people to high-risk (relatively having a worse genetic bill) people. 
Next I will discuss this issue.
B. Normative Problems of Adverse Selection
  Eric Mills Holmes notes that "adverse selection is substantially present, low-risk 
people `actually subsidize the insurance purchases of high risks."'214) 
  On the normative level, whether the death (downward) spiral scenario triggered 
by adverse selection is true or not is not a crucial issue. The more important 
normative issue that adverse selection presents is that it creates cross-subsidizing 
between low-risk insureds and high-risk insureds. Asymmetry of information is a 
problem not only between insurance companies and policyholders who know their 
negative genetic information but also between low-risk policyholders and high-risk 
policy holders. This is so because asymmetry of information (adverse selection) 
leads to, whether it is intentional or not, justified forced redistribution of wealth 
from low-risk policyholders to high-risk policyholders. Indeed, this is the very 
reason low-risk policyholders opt to flee from the insurance pool. This normative 
issue cannot be cleared even under the universal health insurance system, although 
the degree of subsidization or redistribution can somewhat be mitigated. Therefore, 
subsidization resulting from adverse selection is one of the key issues when we 
review the arguments for and against a legal legislation designed to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of predictive medical information including genetic 
information. Adverse selection has been seen as the issue in the insurance settings, 
however, as long as most of the health insurance is provided through employers 
either in group health plans or self-insured plans in the U.S., it is closely relevant o
213) Such an argument can be found in Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrintination Laws In Health 
    Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 QuINNirInc HEALTH L.J. 149, 171 n.83 (2001). 
214) Eric Mills Holmes, supra note 48, at 543-44 (1996-7) (quoting Mark J. Browne & Helen 1. 
    Doerpinghaus, Information Asymnietrics and Adverse Selection in the Market for Individual
    Medical Expense Insurance, 60 J. Of RISK & INS. 300 (1993)).
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the employment field. Moreover, the saine structure of asymmetry of negative 
genetic information between the employees and employers or among employees 
exists, as has been seen in the arguments presented by Richard A. Epstein. He calls 
it "fraud," "deception or concealment," and "implicit cross-subsidies." This issue 
involves the justice issue which has been illustrated by old and still ongoing 
controversies between egalitarian liberal and libertarian or school of law and 
economics over social justice and legal intervention with the market ransactions. 
To address this core issue behind the arguments over the genetic discrimination and 
anti-discrimination laws is beyond the scope of this paper. However, here I would 
like to confirm that without considering the justice and fairness issue, we cannot 
make a persuasive argument and solve the fundamental issues over genetic 
discrimination and anti-discrimination and find the way out of the dilemma that 
these issues pose - a dilemma that we have to protect people with genetic 
abnormality, but enacting enetic-specific antidiscrimination laws results in raising 
serious and unavoidable normative problems such as creating inequality and unfair 
treatment between the people who have a negative genetic profile and those who 
have a negative nongenetic medical profile, and also exacerbating inequality 
between the socio-economic lasses as we have seen in the arguments presented by 
Suter in Part IV-B. In this sense, I agree to Epstein's understanding in which the 
genetic discrimination issue is no différent from other types of traditional 
discrimination, although I do not agree to his substantial argument and conclusion 
to the issue. Accordingly, one of the real issues that requires further discussion and 
debate is the question of whether it would be fair to subsidize from genetically 
healthy (lucky) people to unhealthy (unlucky) people through the health insurance 
system.
               III. Conclusion 
Reconstructing the Real Issues for Further Discussions -
  My research began with the initial awareness that the Human Genome Project 
has already opened the door of Pandora's box and inside this box there is a book 
entitled "Genetic Secret of Our Lives" containing biological genetic information. 
In the twenty-first century, the advancement of genetic technology would seem to 
pose one of the most serious civil rights issues. I believe that in this century genetic 
discrimination will be the most serious and widespread class of discrimination in 
the legal discourse. Under this understanding, I focused on genetic discrimination 
in the health insurance and employment arena and addressed the underlying issues
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and problems of genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws and noted that the real 
issue has not yet been solved and the ultimate question is whether it is justifiable to 
protect the privacy of all predictive medical information in the insurance and 
employment context. 
  In order to answer this question, in this paper I reviewed the arguments and 
debates for and against the legal prohibition on the use of all predictive medical 
information, especially focusing on the health insurance setting. 
  After looking into many arguments delivered by several commentators, I 
analyzed the so-called "adverse selection" problem because it seems to be one of 
the most serious unintended consequences on the health insurance industry in the 
case where the law prohibits insurers from using genetic information in their 
underwriting process. Indeed, adverse selection has been referred to as one of the 
most compelling justifications for using genetic information in the insurance arena 
and it would be one of the most persuasive grounds against anti-discrimination 
laws. I noted that whether or not the so-called "downward spiral" scenario of 
adverse selection legal prohibition creates asymmetry of negative genetic 
information on future risks -* high risk individuals buy more insurance 
disproportionately -> increase premiums of all policyholders to maintain the 
solvency of the insurance companies - low-risk insureds leave the pool (plans) -p 
death (downward) spiral of premium set in motion - result in collapse of the 
insurance market - ultimately create many uninsured people would occur is 
not certain at the present ime because mpirical data have not been accumulated to 
answer this, and also it is not so serious in the health insurance market, contrary to 
life insurance. Therefore, I asserted that the argument resorting to adverse selection 
is not strong enough to deny legal prohibitions as a practical reason to preserve the 
insurance industry. 
  However, I noted that adverse selection poses a serious problem on the 
theoretical level. It creates inequality (disparity in information) not only between 
insurance companies and policyholders but also between low-risk policyholders and 
high-risk policyholders and this results in redistribution and subsidization from 
those (low-risk individuals) who have a clean bill of genetic profiles to those who 
do not. Accordingly, the legal policy which intends to protect all predictive 
medical information creates unintended unfairness between the policyholders. 
Historically, treating policyholders differently according to their future health risks 
(medical information and health condition) has been regarded as an "actuarially 
sound fair discrimination." Therefore, prohibiting the use of genetic information is 
against he actuariat fairness principle in the underwriting and equal risk spreading
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process in the health insurance system in the U.S. 
  Moreover, as has been seen in the arguments presented by Richard A. Epstein, 
anti-discrimination laws justify fraud, deception or concealment by people with 
genetic disorders and implicit cross-subsidies caused by adverse selection, and 
impose the hidden cost on insurance companies and employers because they have 
strong economic incentives to know the predictive medical information of their 
policyholders and employees. Accordingly, contrary to my initial expectation, I 
have reached the conclusion that the arguments opposing legislation banning 
genetic tests and discriminatory use of genetic information seem to be more 
persuasive theoretically as long as we presuppose the long-standing private health 
insurance system in the United States. 
  I asserted that regardless of whether we accept Epstein's argument or not, the 
inescapable question that we have to answer is who would compensate these hidden 
costs resulting from passing anti-discrimination laws. I concluded that a universal 
national health insurance system like the one in Japan should be introduced in the 
U.S. where health insurance is provided as a primary goods-social security, as 
many other countries do. This is simply because in order to receive sufficient 
health care, health insurance is indispensable to our lives. And also the right to 
genetic privacy and the right to know and not to know one's own genetic 
information should be regarded as a fundamental right and should be enlisted in the 
catalogue of the Bill of Rights of the 21st century. This is simply because genetic 
information is the most private information not only for the individual but also his/ 
her family and is prone to be very sensitive to discrimination. By introducing some 
kind of universal national health insurance system, we can solve the problems 
which impose hidden costs on insurers and employers. 
  However, we still have to answer another question of what the theoretical 
grounds are to justify redistribution and subsidization from those (low-risk 
individuals) who have a clean bill of genetic profiles to those who do not, which 
would result from introducing a universal national health insurance system. This is 
not an easy question to answer because as I have mentioned in this paper, there is a 
fundamental philosophical quandary of distributive justice or fairness over the 
issue. To explore the question of what is fair in the genetic era, we have to examine 
the persistent and recurrent theoretical conflict between Libertarianism and 
Liberalism v.s. Communitarianism over justice and fairness.
Chetan Gulati mentioned this issue by referring to Deborah Hellman:
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Drawing on Rawls's philosophy, she notes that from a normative 
perspective, because good health is generally a matter of luck, people are 
not entitled to benefit from their good health and thus they have no 
entitlement o actuarially fair pricing. Hellman then proposes a 
competing moral view that draws upon the philosophy of Robert Nozick 
that posits that even if good health is undeserved, people are entitled to 
the benefits of their good fortune and therefore they are entitled to 
actuarially fair pricing. Hellman concludes that those who take the 
Rawlsian position would "likely believe that risk rating is unjustified in 
most cases" and that "this rationale supports community rating and 
single-payer schemes." ... Those who take Nozick's position are likely 
to believe that forcing healthy individuals to pay for the health insurance 
of unhealthy individuals is a denial of liberty because il does not allow 
the healthy individuals to fully exercise their liberty and thus, "this 
rationale supports the utilization of risk rating by private insurers."215)
  Examining this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I would like 
to conclude this paper by confirming that without examining this issue carefully, 
the genetic discrimination issue can not be ultimately solved. Therefore, my 
research will continue to explore how to reconstruct the concept of fairness and 
equality in this genetic century.
215) Chetan Gulati, supra note 195, at 171 n.83 (2001) (citing Deborah Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair 
    Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-
    C.L. L. REV. 355, 400-01 (1997)).
